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Abstract
TITLE: U.S. Government Acquisition Reform and its Influence on Defense
Contracting, Innovation, Diversification, and Collaboration
AUTHOR: Edgar Quiñones Jr.
MAJOR ADVISOR: B. Andrew Cudmore, Ph.D.
Acquisition reform has been active within the Defense Industry for over two
centuries and continues to this day for the Federal Government. Recently, due to
sequestration, high national debt, and political pressures, the Weapon System
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) and Better Buying Power (BBP) was put into
action, in 2009 and 2010 respectively, as a way to further streamline the Defense
Industry.
This study examined the Defense Industry’s attitudes and coping strategies
(focused on ‘countervailing power’) deal with the actions and the influence of a
monopsonist (sole) buyer on the contracting process and how that ultimately affects
costs, industry strategy, innovation, and diversification. Through the utilization of
descriptive design survey-based methodology, theory-based hypotheses were
tested.
The study found that perceptions of BBP indicate an impact to contract
costs, innovation, industry collaboration, and diversification. The implications of
these findings set the groundwork for future research on the complicated

iii

relationship between the Government and the Defense Industry especially in terms
of the BBP.

Key Words: Monopsony, Transaction Costs, Pluralism, Better Buying Power,
Defense Industry, Arms Market, Acquisition Reform, Competitive Collaboration,
Innovation, Diversification, and Perceived Contractual Costs.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Overview
Due to high national debts and budgetary constraints, acquisition reform has
recently become (and continues to be) a topic of interest in the Defense Industry
(NDIA, 2014). After the 2008 fiscal crisis, federal budgets have been placed in a
period of automatic cuts, one of which being defense spending (McLean, 2015).
Such restrictions have put pressure on the Government to enact acquisition reform
within the Defense Industry to save money with a shrinking budget. However,
acquisition reform in of itself is not a new topic, according to Fox (2012);
acquisition reform has been going on since the sixties and even much earlier. In
one of its latest series of acquisition reforms, the United States Department of
Defense launched the Better Buying Power (BBP) program in 2010. The purpose
of this program is to streamline the defense acquisition supply chain, reduce costs,
and increase the buying power of the U.S. Government (Kendall, 2016). BBP’s
main goals are to achieve affordable programs, control lifecycle costs, incentivize
productivity and innovation, eliminate wastes, promote competition, improve
tradecraft in services, and improve professionalism in the acquisition workforce. A
further breakdown of BBP is provided in Chapter 2.
The following dissertation was written to expand the stream of literature,
within the field of ‘industrial organization’ in the context of monopsonies in an
attempt to build a framework summarizing the Defense Industry’s strategies to
1

mitigate high buyer power. Examples of acquisition reform, such as BBP, provide
a lens by which to investigate how monopsonistic buyer behavior influences
contractual expenses (NDIA, 2014). Whereas a monopoly occurs when there is one
seller or one major seller in an industry (Panzar & Rosse, 1987), a monopsony
occurs when there is one buyer or one major buyer within a market (Organization
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), (2008). Even though the
Defense Industry has multiple buyers, which includes, the U.S. Government,
Foreign Governments, other defense companies, and commercial buyers, the U.S.
Government is the biggest buyer and considered the largest customer in the world
by the Small Business Administration (SBA) (2017). However, given that the U.S.
Government must approve all import and exports of defense sales, and international
sales are typically Foreign Military Sale (FMS) contracts where the U.S.
Government is the intermediary, the U.S. Government, in reality, acts as the sole
buyer and can act like a monopsony.
Therefore, this study is concerned with how the Defense Industry sellers
perceive and strategize for this monopsonistic relationship in an environment where
transaction costs are paramount. The next section introduces the applied theories
and concepts that guided the research within this study.
Conceptual Framework
The study used industrial organization as it’s framework theory. The
concept of industrial organization is concerned with the level of market/industry
2

power firms and buyers have in relation to each other (Jacquemin, 1987). For
sellers it is a continuum of increasing market power from perfect competition (low
market power) (Chamberlin, 1933), monopolistic competition (some market power)
(Robinson, 1969), oligopoly (high market power) (Bain, 1949), and monopoly (full
market power) (Demsetz, 1973). On the other end, buyers have a continuum, as
well, in as it relates to power over the industry. For buyers, the continuum consists
of fragmented buyers (low industry power) (Cox, 2001), customers with bargaining
power (some industry power) (OECD, 2008), oligopsony (high industry power)
(Bhaskar & To, 2003), and monopsony (total industry power) (Caves, 1980).
Primarily, the literature covering monopsonies are focused on employer
monopsonists who are customers of labor (Bhaskar and Manning, 2002), (Manning,
2003), and (OECD, 2008) or monopsonists who acquire products and services from
suppliers and sell to an end user such as Amazon (Krugman, 2014) or Walmart
(Jimenez, 2002). This study instead examines a monopsonist (U.S. Government)
that acquires products and services as opposed to an employer monopsonist, who
acquires labor, as well as a monopsonist that serves as an end user of the acquired
products and services, and thus does not only sell to another customer. Thus, this
study focused on the buyer perspective as it pertains to industry and focusing solely
on monopsonistic power as it relates to the U.S. Government and their
implementation of acquisition reform through BBP. The concept of monopsonies,
while discussed in the literature, is far less developed in comparison to monopolies.
3

According to the OECD (2008), a monopsonist has the following
characteristics:
•

Is a sole buyer or a very large buyer

•

Can extract quasi-rents by reducing costs and to some extent can be
classified as a “Price Maker,” which is able to influence and potentially
determine prices

•

Has strong bargaining power

•

Suppliers selling to the buyer have a high level of financial dependency on
the monopsonist

•

The goal of this type of buyer is to minimize costs as opposed to the goal of
the firm to maximize profits
This study examined the relationship between BBP’s implementation and its

impact on ‘Transaction Costs’ by looking at how the Defense Industry perceives
changes in contract costs in response to monopsonistic influence via acquisition
reform and in order to investigate the pros and cons of BBP. In addition, this study
examined how the Defense Industry has been impacted by these changes and
provided recommendations to both the U.S. Government and the Defense Industry
on potential path forwards. This study then examined the trends in competitive
collaboration in order to understand current levels of countervailing power, a
method designed to counter a monopsonist’s bargaining power through
collaboration (OECD, 2008). Thus, this concept is a contribution to Industrial
4

Organization literature in that normally this enactment of countervailing power is
discussed from the opposite perspective of dealing with a monopolist, rather than
the collaboration required to influence the bargaining power of a monopsonist. A
further contribution is provided by examining this collaboration from two
perspectives: political influence ‘pluralism’ and competitive collaboration ‘coopetition. The contribution of the study will be discussed further in Chapter 5 after
the findings section. The following section presents the research questions and is
followed by a discussion of how this study contributes to the Industrial
Organization literature and the resulting managerial implications.
Note: Appendix A contains the common definitions and acronyms used throughout
this dissertation.
Questions that Guide the Research
1. How does monopsonistic behavior, through acquisition reform, influence
perceived contract costs?
2. How does monopsonistic behavior, through acquisition reform, impact
innovation in the long term?
3. How is countervailing power being utilized within the Defense Industry as a
result of monopsonistic influence through acquisition reform?
4. How has acquisition reform influenced commercial diversification?

5

Literature Contribution and Managerial Implications
According to Galbraith (2017), countervailing power works in a monopoly
case but is limited as a method for mitigating monopsonistic power. This is due to
the fact that fragmented buyers can legally work together to increase their
bargaining power against a monopolist, but for suppliers to work together against a
monopsonist, there is risk of anti-trust law violations (Green and Porter, 1984).
Thus, suppliers cannot collude to fix prices and have to collaborate in other ways to
increase their bargaining power. Therefore, examining the methods how suppliers
collaborate to increase their bargaining power is the importance of this study. For
example, the Federal Trade Commission forbids anti-competitive measures such as
price-fixing, bid-rigging, and illegal group boycotts (FTC, 2000). It was the intent
of this study to explore the methods an industry can utilize to create and maintain
countervailing power that does not violate anti-trust laws but can be utilized to
mitigate monopsonistic power (Blair & Harrison, 1993). For example, the FTC
acknowledges that sometimes competitors collaborate and encourages it in cases
such as expanding into foreign markets, funding expensive innovative projects, and
lowering production and other costs (FTC, 2000).
By gathering, critiquing, and generalizing the Defense Industry perspectives
and strategies to mitigate the bargaining power of a monopsonist (the U.S.
Government), a framework was developed for managerial use within the context of
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acquisition reform (BBP) this framework is provided in Chapter 5. Results from
this framework may also translate to other industries with monopsonistic buyers.
Finally, this study assisted in providing a better understanding of the
potential tradeoff between a focus on reducing productions costs (execution costs),
via BBP (Kendall, 2015) at the expense of transaction costs (contract costs) due to
the increased costs for contract compliance. At present, BBP seeks to reduce
lifecycle program costs (execution costs) by creating incentive-based contracts
(Kendall, 2015). This focus on program costs could inadvertently increase
transaction costs due to changes in contract types based on the concept of ‘contract
inertia,’ i.e. the costs of attempting to change standard contracting approaches
(Korobkin, 1998). Thus, this study investigated the impacts of these contract costs
as a result of BBP. Therefore, these impacts, which will be expand upon further in
Chapters 4 and 5, demonstrated that there is a perception of cost increases as a
result of BBP. The next section discusses the layout of the paper and the path
dynamics of the study.
Organization of the remainder of the Paper
This section discusses the layout of the paper and the path dynamics of the
study. The remainder of this dissertation has been broken into four additional
chapters following Chapter 1’s Introduction. Chapter 2 goes over the review of the
literature in which discussions of theoretical frameworks are analyzed and
synthesized. Chapter 3 goes over the utilized methods, which included a
7

descriptive statistical analysis and grounded theory utilizing a survey method for
data collection. Chapter 4 discusses the findings of the study. Chapter 5 discusses
the implications of the findings. The front-end of the paper laid the groundwork for
the proposed study and the back-end includes the research findings of the
completed study. The research dissertation followed the writing guidelines of the
American Psychological Association 6th edition in accordance with the Publication
Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA, 2009).
The following chapter, Chapter 2, contains the Literature Review. The
literature is inclusive of scholarly articles, reputable books, industry reports, market
analyses, Corporate 10-K forms, Industry Publications, and Government
Publications. Finally, the data has been collected from research sites such as the
FIT Library, Google Scholar, Microsoft Academic, Monster Meta-Search, Statista,
the CIA World Factbook, and Yahoo Finance.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Overview
Background.
The following chapter reviews industrial organization and transaction cost
literature to generate the hypotheses to answer the research questions provided in
Chapter 1. After the 2008 financial crisis, federal budgets have been put on
restrictions, and a system was put in place called sequestration. Sequestration is the
automatic decrease in mandatory spending, which includes defense spending
(Keating, 2014). Such spending cuts have put pressure on the Government to enact
acquisition reform within the Defense Industry to save money on a shrinking
budget. These budgetary constraints could have unknown consequences for the
Defense Industry. However, even in times of economic change, through innovation
and adaptability, organizations can create value (Zott & Amit, 2012). Thus, for
defense contractors, value can be created from organizations who find ways to
adapt to acquisition reform by shifting their strategies to align with contractual
changes of their customer. Therefore, examining how the Defense Industry has
adapted to BBP can be beneficial in understanding how industry changes it strategy
in environments of acquisition reform. The intent of Better Buying Power (BBP)
is, “to do more with less” (Carter, 2010) or reduce productions costs. Based on the
intent of the program it appears that the Government’s implementation of BBP does
not take into account the consequent transaction costs due to the fact that all of the
9

focus areas of BBP deal with program costs and does not take into account contract
costs. The reason for this omission may be unintentional, on the Government’s
behalf, but warrants investigation as to how contract costs are impacted.
Understanding these cost impacts can lay the groundwork of future research as to if
the tradeoff is beneficial to the Government. This provided an interesting context
by which to examine the countervailing power bargaining strategies of the Defense
Industry when dealing with a monopsonist.
The study’s academic approach focused primarily on business disciplines
but also considers political science interdisciplinary approaches based on Dunning
(1989) plea for a multidisciplinary approach to research. Specifically, this study
focuses on Government to business relations and the political/legal environment.
To better illustrate the business process between the Defense Industry and the
Government, Appendix B provides the contracting process between a company,
specifically a defense contractor, and the U.S. Government. In addition, Appendix
B provides a brief history of acquisition reform leading to BBP. The following
section provides an explanation of how the Government defines BBP as well as its
intended purpose.
Better Buying Power (BBP) Breakdown.
According to the Department of Defense, BBP is centered on seven focus
areas:
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Focus Area 1: Achieving Affordable Programs.
According to Durante (2011), this focus area deals with conducting program
management of cost-constrained programs with the goal of providing resources to
the Department of Defense. These resources are inclusive of funding, schedule,
and workforce. Affordability deals with cost control within contracts (Durante,
2011). To implement this focus area, the Government is attempting to enforce
affordability caps. A focus on affordability for the Government is the essence of
BBP, enforcing affordability caps can put increased risks on defense contractors
and could reduce profitability since it puts pressure on defense contractors to lower
costs, thus de-incentivize the Defense Industry.
Focus Area 2: Control Costs throughout the Product Lifecycle.
According to Kendall (2012), the purpose of this focus area is to anticipate
and attempt to control future costs of a program’s inception. To implement this
focus area, the Government creates independent cost estimates to set a target cost
goal that they will be held accountable for controlling when contracting with a
defense contractor.
Focus Area 3: Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry and
Government.
According to Carter (2011), this focus area deals with rewarding defense
contractors for successful supply chain management as well as indirect expense
management. To accomplish this, the Government will award certain contract
11

types designed to give incentive fees to the contractor if they manage their supply
chains to lower costs and maintain superior performance (Hagel, 2014).
Focus Area 4: Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy.
According to Kendall (2011), the primary purpose of this focus area is to
remove any unnecessary or non-value-added processes or documentation that will
slow down the acquisition process for both the Government and the Defense
Industry. Such processes include extensive administration efforts for both the
Government and defense contractors that would lower productivity.
Focus Area 5: Promote Competition.
According to Kendall (2014), this focus area is concerned with the
reduction of barriers to entry and allowance of additional competitors to drive
down costs through competition. This focus area also seeks to create opportunities
for small businesses. Note that competition in this context, as well as throughout
this paper, is defined as the incumbents within the Defense Industry that compete
for market share. Thus, the promotion of increased competitors would increase this
number of incumbents, and therefore the intent is to strengthen the Government’s
negotiation position by having more competition (Kendall, 2014).
Focus Area 6: Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services.
According to the Defense Acquisition University (2012), this focus area
deals with the improvement of tradecraft services for the purpose of reducing the
costs of service contracting. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government intends to
12

improve requirements definitions to ensure that contracts are well understood and
executed by the contractor. In addition, the Government seeks to improve contract
management to ensure that the programs are well managed, costs are reduced, and
that requirements are reviewed by the Government with its Contractor. In addition,
this focus area seeks to increase market research and encourage small business
participation.
Focus Area 7: Improve the Professionalism of the Total Acquisition
Workforce.
According to Kendall (2013), the purpose of this focus area is to improve
the educational background of the U.S. Government acquisition team. To
accomplish this, the U.S. Government wants to ensure that each of its employees
responsible for managing the acquisition of supplies and services have the proper
certification, college education, and training. Also, this focus area seeks to
recognize excellence and maintain a cost-conscious acquisition workforce. Thus,
the intent of this focus area is to align Government acquisition employees with a
goal of cutting costs and therefore, negotiations and contracting between defense
contractors will be focused in this manner. The following section defines the
difference between the usage of the terms ‘markets’ and ‘industries’ as it pertains to
this study.

13

Markets versus Industries.
While often used synonymously within much of the literature, the terms
markets and industries are not synonymous and are defined distinctively.
According to Steiner (1984), an industry is where companies participate and
compete; in addition, a market is where customers or a group of customers
participate to buy. Therefore, industries sell to markets and markets procure from
industries.
In the case of defense and arms sales, the Defense Industry is the seller and
therefore the industry, and the U.S. Government, Foreign Governments, State
Governments, Local Governments, other defense contractors, and some
commercial customers (both domestic and international) are the Arms Market.
However, since sales of defense technology typically do not go through state and
local governments, rather directly to the Federal Government, and since the sales of
defense technology within the United States to foreign and commercial markets
require approval by the U.S. Government, the Federal Government is the primary
customer. Thus, the U.S. Government is a monopsony in that most sales from U.S.
defense contractors is to the Government and the Government has control over the
exports of defense technology (Kovacic & Smallwood, 1994). According to King
and Driessnack (2007), the Defense Industry is an oligopoly and the Arms
Manufacturing market’s buyer, the Government, is a monopsony. A monopoly
occurs when one company controls all or most of an industry, while a monopsony
14

occurs when one buyer controls all or most of the market (Depeyre & Dumez,
2009). The following section discusses the theoretical framework and supporting
theories that lead to the hypotheses.
Theoretical Framework
Industrial Organization.
Overview.
The concept of industrial organization, sometimes called industrial
economy, is concerned with the market power held by firms over markets in
relation to the industry they participate in and the level of industry power held by
buyers over industries in relation to the market they participate (Porter, 1981).
Within industrial organization, there are two continuum that encompass the
concept, the first being the market structure continuum and the other being the
industry structure continuum (Mariti & Smiley, 1983). Market structure continuum
is concerned with, in increasing power, perfect competition (Stigler, 1957),
monopolistic competition (Blanchard, & Kiyotaki, 1987), oligopoly (Bresnahan,
1982), and monopoly (Pauly, 1998). The industry structure continuum is concerned
with, in increasing power, fragmented buyers, buyers with bargaining power,
oligopsony, and monopsony (Noll, 2004).

15

Market Structure.
Overview.
Market structures encompass the level of market share firms within an
industry have, thus includes the level of competition and power of the sellers
(Mariti & Smiley, 1983). In addition, this includes the level of competitor
incumbent exit barriers and barriers to entry for new companies.
Perfect Competition.
The characteristics of perfect competition include: a large number of sellers
in the industry (McNulty, 1967), homogeneous products/services, zero barriers to
entry and exit, participants are price takers, and have zero transaction costs
(Roberts, 1987). Because of a large amount of sellers and low barriers to entry,
such industries are considered unattractive due to low-profit margins and low
selling power (Porter, 1980).
Monopolistic Competition.
The characteristics of monopolistic competition are a somewhat large
number of sellers in the industry (Krugman, 1979), low entry and exit barriers, and
heterogeneous products/services (Roberts, 1987). Because of the large amount of
sellers, firms have often very low selling power and are still somewhat of a price
taker, though they have some aspects of price making (Roberts, 1987).
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Oligopoly.
The characteristics of oligopolies are few sellers in the industry, high entry
and exit barriers, and heterogeneous products/services (Salop, 2004). Because of
the few numbers of suppliers, oligopolies are often considered price makers
(Sweezy, 1939), though often refrain from competing on price to avoid price wars
(Salop, 2004). Such an industry is considered attractive due to low competition and
high entry barriers (Porter, 1980). As mentioned above, the Defense Industry can
be classified as an oligopoly due to few large sellers with significant market share
(King & Driessnack, 2007), as well as based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(Davis, 2006).
Monopoly.
The characteristics of a monopoly include the ability to maximize profits
through price making (Posner, 1975), high entry and exit barriers, and are a sole
seller or seller with a significantly high market share (Caves, 1980). In such a case
the firm is the industry and the industry is the firm (Caves, 1980).
Industry Structure.
Overview.
Industry structures encompass the level of industry share buyers within a
market have which encompasses the level of buying power (OECD, 2008).
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Fragmented Buyer.
The characteristics of fragmented buyers include no bargaining power and
low entry and exit barriers. This is due to the high volume of competing buyers
and thus leads to high options for the sellers (OECD, 2008).
Buyers with Bargaining Power.
The characteristics of buyers with bargaining power include some levels of
bargaining power and low entry and exit barriers (OECD, 2008). This is due to the
high volume of competing buyers, yet enough control over the market segment to
have some negotiation capabilities; however, this power is limited due to high
options for the sellers (Pauly, 1998).
Oligopsony.
The characteristics of oligopsonies include high levels of bargaining power
(Azzam, 1995) and high entry and exit barriers (Bergman & Brännlund, 1995).
This is due to the low volume of competing buyers (Chen & Lent, 1992), which
grants the oligopsonist high bargaining power over the sellers (Bergman &
Brännlund, 1995).
Monopsony.
As discussed in Chapter 1, this study focuses its attention on monopsonistic
behavior, with the intent of exploring what trends are occurring in the form of
countervailing power to mitigate the bargaining power of the Government. The
Defense Industry is a unique industry in that its buyer is primarily the United States
18

Government. Sales outside the United States, both commercial and defense have to
be approved by the United States Government and are subject to both export and
import control laws. Because of the Government’s position of being the largest
buyer in sales, largest customer in the world (SBA, 2017), and its regulatory
capability, the United States Government demonstrates monopsonistic behavior.
According to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) (2008), buyer power is how one party can affect the terms of
trade within another. The OECD identifies buyers that have bargaining power;
bargaining power deals with the strength a buyer has with its supplier(s) and
focuses its discussion on buyers with monopsony power. Monopsony power in
which a buyer is either the sole buyer or is a significant buyer that controls most of
the demand. Therefore, in a monopsony type market, the buyer is the market and
the market is the buyer. Due to the fact that buyer power is considered a force in
Porter’s Five Force model, the higher the power of buyers, the less attractive the
industry (Porter, 1980). Thus, a monopsony type market would be the least
attractive scenario as it pertains to this force. Therefore, examining the trends in
the industry and analyzing how the industry can mitigate this buyer power can have
managerial implications that could extend to industries beyond the Defense
Industry.
A monopsonist has the ability to lower prices by simply purchasing less and
less, just like how a monopolist has the ability to raise prices by producing less and
19

less (Gholz & Sapolsky, 2000). Thus, due to high buyer power, a monopsonist has
greater control over the production, pricing, and relationships within the industry
(Depeyre, & Dumez, 2010). However, procuring less and less can disincentive
suppliers and potentially cause suppliers to exit the market, such a situation is not
ideal for a monopsonist; thus, such an approach can only be utilized in the shortrun. A monopsonist has control over demand in the same fashion that a monopolist
has control over supply (Manning, 2003). Therefore, a monopsonist has direct
control over how the industry invests in future products and services since the
monopsonist controls demand. Therefore, since a monopsonist can influence
demand through profit incentives, a monopsonist can influence the industry to
invest in product and service development based on its stated need and buying
behavior which could impact innovation. In the case of BBP, the Government
claims it utilizes profit incentives for innovation and cost control (Kendall, 2016).
However, these incentives are based on contract execution, thus are production cost
focused, BBP does not provide incentives for cost control within the contracting
process itself.
According to Wyld, Pugh, & Tyrrall (2012), a monopsonist can hold
suppliers captive if they have high knowledge of the supplier’s costs. Such is the
case of Government contracting in which suppliers are legally required to certify
cost or pricing data under the Truth In Negotiations Act (TINA), should such price
exceed the threshold (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2005). In the case of Wyld
20

et al. (2012), companies like Wal-Mart, for example, have significant market power
that can be exploitive on suppliers. However, such suppliers do not have the
specialized capabilities of defense contractors. Thus, the Defense Industry has
more negotiation capabilities than Wal-Mart’s suppliers, in that defense contractors
are not as abundant and produce highly differentiated products, thus in some cases,
defense contractors can benefit from monopolistic power in the specific product or
services they serve within certain defense programs. In addition, companies like
Wal-Mart have to focus on profit; thus, any savings in prices roll down to their
bottom line. In contrast, the Government is cost driven and must abide by
shrinking budgets, thus not focused on profits, but rather on budgets which are
often dependent on political decisions. Therefore, its strategy and focus are
concerned with cost-reduction, as opposed to the Defense Industry which is
focused on profit maximization, thus unlike Walmart, the methods the Government
employs will often not be in alignment with a profit motivated monopsonist.
Finally, the role of competition within the supply base can be both
advantageous to the Government and detrimental. Too many suppliers lead to
higher transaction costs of management. Too few suppliers lead to higher costs via
monopoly power of sole source suppliers. Therefore, acquisition reform could be
beneficial or detrimental to the Government if there is not an optimal amount of
competition, such as ‘dual sourcing’ (Hunter, Sanders, McCormick, Cohen, &
McQuade, 2015). Thus, competition levels could influence managing and
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enforcement transaction costs and could impact existing relations with incumbent
defense contractors. According to Li and Debo (2009), a buyer can benefit from
having one supplier and creating and sustaining a long-term relationship with that
source in which the buyer can create a streamlined process as well as understand
the supplier’s capabilities. However, a buyer can also benefit from short-term
relationships by being able to have a choice amongst suppliers and potentially find
a best-cost provider (Thomson, Strickland, & Gamble, 2009). Relationship
building and switching time between suppliers as well as market research time can
impact transaction costs in the form of bargaining or contract negotiations and thus
perceived contractual costs as a whole. Thus, disruptions to this form of
relationships could increase transaction costs in the form of uncertainty, which is a
transaction cost (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). These increases in transaction costs
could disincentive the Defense Industry to continue in these market segments
should alternatives arise, such as Boeing that has its commercial segment (Boeing,
2016), and give incumbent defense contractors more monopolistic power,
countering the goal of BBP.
Industrial Organization Illustration.
The below figure is an illustration of the Industrial Organization literature
detailed above. In addition, it is important to note that while the “Market
Structure” continuum can be found in much of the literature in Industrial
Organization. As such, the Market Structure is a continuum of increasing industry
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concentration from Perfect Competition at the lowest level to Monopoly at the
highest level. However, the “Industry Structure” as a continuum is not present and
was built directly for this study by piecing together different readings in the
literature to mirror the “Market Structure” as a comparable complement. The
literature does include “Oligopsony” as a mirror to “Oligopoly” and “Monopsony”
as a mirror to “Monopoly,” but it does not have a counterpart for “Perfect
Competition” and “Monopolistic Competition.” Therefore, the terms “Fragmented
Buyer” and “Bargaining Power Buyer” are terms coined in this study as mirrored
counterparts for “Perfect Competition” and “Monopolistic Competition”
respectively. Thus, this continuum looks at Fragmented Buyer as the lowest level
of the Industry Structure, and Monopsony as the highest level.

23

Figure 1 Industrial Organization Spectrums
Market Structure Continuum
(Mariti & Smiley, 1983)

Industry Structure Continuum
(OECD, 2008)

Perfect Competition
(Roberts, 1987)

Fragmented Buyer (Cox,
2001)

Monopolistic Competition
(Roberts, 1987)

Bargaining Power Buyer
(OECD, 2008)

Oligopoly (Bain, 1949)

Oligopsony (Bhaskar & To,
2003)

Monopoly (Demsetz, 1973)

Monopsony (Caves, 1980)

Legend:
Yellow: Defense Industry (Based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Davis, 2006)
Green: Arms Market (USG) based on attributes of monopsonies (OECD, 2008).

Note: As the competition segment becomes more concentrated (i.e., the more
powerful the buyer or seller) on either spectrum, transaction costs increase due to
the need for contracts as well as increased ambiguity and more asymmetric
information (Chamberlin, 1933). It is also important to note that within agency
theory, asymmetrical information can lead to a conflict of interest amongst the
parties (Ross, 1973). This is due to the fact that the Government serves as the
principal and the contractor serves as the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Both may have
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differing goals, the Government wants to meet mission needs, and the contractor is
motivated by the shareholders demands (Hill & Jones, 1992). Thus, when
examining impacts of BBP, it will be important to understand both perspectives,
which this study examined in the Chapter 5 Discussions section. The next section
discusses countervailing power as a means for mitigating monopsonistic power
which is broken into two components, political influence (pluralism) and
competitive collaboration (co-opetition). In addition, the next section provides
supporting theories that assist the theoretical framework and research.
Relevant Models, Theories, and Concepts
Countervailing Power.
Overview.
Countervailing power is the concept that a buyer or a group of buyers can
extract bargaining power from suppliers by controlling the level of competition in
their favor (Galbraith, 1954). Countervailing power can be accomplished by the
selection of a group of suppliers to compete one off of the other (Ungern-Sternberg,
1996). The reverse case could apply to suppliers through collusion, the issue with
collusion, however, is that anti-trust laws forbid collusion (OECD, 2008).
However, anti-trust laws do not forbid suppliers seeking Government influence
(pluralism), which in turn can mitigate buyer power, or collaborating (co-opetition)
via joint-ventures, complementary products, or joint-diversification. Thus, these
methods can serve as a form of countervailing power from the buyer by allowing
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for competition to work more jointly in a fashion that does not violate anti-trust
laws (Blair & Harrison, 1990). Thus, this study is concerned with looking at
countervailing power in two different forms, Co-opetition (Brandenburger and
Malebuff 1998) and Pluralism (Connolly, 1995).
Co-Opetition.
In the case of monopolies, countervailing power can exist when buyers
collaborate to influence the monopolist to provide lower prices or better terms in a
contract (OECD, 2008). According to Brandenburger and Malebuff (1998),
competitors can benefit from collaboration to the extent possible that they do not
violate anti-trust laws, the concept called cooperative competition or co-opetition.
Co-opetition is the concept that competitors can collaborate to obtain common
success (Dagnino & Padula, 2002). For example, complementary products, jointventures, teaming agreements, and trade associations are all forms of competitive
collaboration. Thus, co-opetition is a form of countervailing power that can allow
firms to reduce monopsonistic buyer power, similar to how collaborating buyers
can reduce monopolistic supplier power.
Porter (1985) argued that competition can be beneficial to industry
incumbents due to mutually-beneficial purposes. Porter (1985) argued that
competitors can limit buyer price sensitivity by creating a standard selling
approach, can create and maintain entry barriers, and can create barriers to foreign
competitors, which occurs within the U.S. Defense Industry. In addition, Porter
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(1985) argued that competitors, as a collective, can influence regulators and even
reduce risks of anti-trust violations due to the presence of viable competition.
Note: For the sake of Hypothesis 1, discussed below, and throughout the study,
“collaboration” is defined as competitors consolidating to do the following:
•

Influence Government Decision Making (Pluralism, see next
section)

•

Utilization of teaming agreements

•

Joint-ventures

•

Complementary products and services utilized on the same
Government programs, such as the F-35 Program, which has
components from major competitors, such as BAE and Northrop
Grumman, yet Lockheed Martin is the Prime Contractor (Lockheed
Martin, 2018).

•

Active participation within trade associations such as NDIA, AIA,
IACCM, and NCMA.

Pluralism.
According to Connolly (1995), Pluralism is the political theory that argues
political decision-making stems from the Government. As mentioned, in this
study, pluralism is being looked at as a form of countervailing power that firms
utilize to influence the Government primarily through lobbying (Snyder, 1996).
While lobbying is not unique in that it seeks to influence Government regulation
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and decision making, it presents a unique situation in that in this case, the
Government being lobbied is also the customer, and this customer is a
monopsonist. Thus, pluralistic influence is a major component of buyer power
influence.
According to McCool (1995), there are three types of pluralism. The first
type is what is identified as laissez-faire pluralism; this type argues that the political
system is not run by a centralized group, instead, an open and competitive
environment where anyone or any group can influence the political system. The
second type, called corporate pluralism, is the concept that interest groups have
direct influence and control within political decisions, an example being corporate
lobbying and trade association lobbying (McCool, 1995). Thus, the primary focus
of, though not limited to, corporate pluralism is lobbying for influence by interest
groups when a government allows for democratic participation and campaign
influence (Theodoulou & Cahn, 1995). Finally, public pluralism is based on the
notion that like laissez-faire pluralism, there is an open and competitive
environment for political influence; however, it argues that such competition may
break down and may require mediation by public officials. In this study, this
research focused on corporate pluralism because this form of pluralism relates to
how a company or an industry can influence a government that is a monopsonistic
buyer. Therefore, any further references to pluralism refer to this type due to the
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scope of the study in reaching out to industry trade associations (see methods
section on sampling).
According to Hisrich, Peters, Manimala, and Shepherd (2012), political
decisions can have a direct impact on industry and business development. In order
for enterprises and industries to survive, Drutman (2010) stated that lobbying is a
necessity as it can drive Government decision making in the organization’s favor,
or in this case an industry’s favor. Lobbying can also be looked at as a necessity
within a company’s strategy since Government decisions can impact the economic
performance of firms and commerce (Daniels, Radebaugh, and Sullivan, 2014).
Drope and Hansen (2009) argued that lobbying as a trade association for common
goals across the industry can be more successful than individual company lobbying
efforts. Thus, lobbying as a collective is one form of countervailing power that
companies can utilize to influence a government monopsonist (Etgar, 1976).
Since the basis of pluralism is that political decisions are made by the
Government, collaboration can be a resource that companies and industries can use
that allows them to counter monopsonistic behavior. According to Lord (2000),
corporations should have a strategy for dealing with external politics and
influencing legislatures. Pluralism can shape how future contractual relations are
conducted from Government to industry due to the fact that Government
regulations can have an influence on contract types and pricing policies, in
addition, the political environment can shape the focus on specific defense
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programs. Since the political environment can influence acquisition reform, this
can influence what programs the Government funds, thus influence defense
contractors to change their investments on different programs in response to the
Government’s shifting focus. How acquisition reform is influencing contractual
relations could shape the Defense Industry’s strategy as a response to these
changes. Thus, to have an influence on monopsonistic power, pluralism is a
necessity for the industry.
Consequently, it is essential to understand if monopsonistic behavior,
through acquisition reform, has led to defense contractors collaborating to influence
contractual regulations and their negotiation position with the Government.
Therefore, focusing on BBP is relevant to the Defense Industry and the U.S.
Government (NDIA, 2014). In addition, investigating BBP allowed for a better
understanding of monopsonistic influence of Government and the Defense
Industry’s reaction. This reaction is expected to take the form of collaboration
strategies.

Hypothesis 1: As a result of BBP, defense contractors will demonstrate
perceived increases in competitive collaboration with each other in order
to circumvent monopsonistic buyer power of the government.
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Implications of H1.
If Hypothesis 1 is supported and there is a perceived increase in competitive
collaboration, then it would appear that acquisition reform has encouraged defense
contractors to increase collaboration. While this does not determine that BBP is the
cause of competitive collaboration, trending increases could imply a relationship.
This could warrant further research to indicate that competitors are collaborating as
a way to mitigate monopsonistic power.
If Hypothesis 1 is not supported, this can still have practical implications for
the Government and the Defense Industry. This could indicate that while
acquisition reform (BBP) has not had an impact on competitive collaboration as of
yet, there may be an advantage to do so. In addition, if it appears there is a
decrease in competitive collaboration, this can raise additional questions as to how
or if BBP is reducing competitive collaboration. In any case, some change in
collaboration may be warranted.
Overall, the implications (both practical and academic) of understanding
collaboration could translate to other industries. The idea behind competitive
collaboration is to create a form of countervailing power. While countervailing
power cannot eliminate monopsonistic power, it could potentially reduce or at least
influence this level of control.
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The next section goes over transaction costs and how acquisition reform
could be impacting these costs within the Government contracting process. This
section discusses the different types of contractual arrangements.
Transaction Cost Economics.
According to a Meiners, Ringleb, and Edwards (2015), a contract arises
when two or more parties come to a legally binding agreement that includes an
offer that is made, acceptance of that offer, and consideration. Williamson (1979)
laid out three different contracting methods. First, he discussed Classical Contract
Law; this form of contracting’s sole purpose is the facilitation of exchange.
Classical Contract Law, however, focuses on discreetness. The idea is that the
other party should not be considered in this contracting method; in fact, input from
a third party is discouraged. Neoclassical Contract Law is more appropriate for
long-term contracts under uncertainty, in such a case, third-party participation in
the form of an arbitrator is encouraged due to their ability to act quickly and
impartially. Relational Contracting focuses on relations between both contracting
parties as opposed to just contract terms, conditions, and scope. Such form of
contracting is gaining more traction and is common within the Defense Industry.
Therefore, acquisition reform could impact these relations in its attempt to increase
buying power.
According to Korobkin (1998), consistent contractual terms and conditions
that remain similar from one contract to the next are preferable to both parties; this
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is called contract inertia. Contract inertia is due to the fact that there are increased
transaction costs when attempting to make changes to the already uniform flow.
Contract inertia is preferable to both parties because it creates a consistent form of
contracting that can be replicated and reduces uncertainty (a transaction cost).
Therefore, if acquisition reform, such as BBP, disrupts this level of consistency,
this could create a new level of uncertainty for how defense contractors need to
operate (Schwartz, 2010). Also, this could impact how firms are currently aligned
to meet the current contracting process, thus requiring firms to invest time and
money to learn a new process.
As discussed, transaction costs are the costs of doing business. According
to Dahlman (1979), transaction costs can be broken into three categories: search
and information costs, the cost of negotiations, and the cost of managing and
enforcing. Search and information costs are the cost of researching the market for
the lowest price and the best overall product or service. Bargaining Costs, also
known as negotiation costs, is the cost of reaching an agreement through
contracting and bartering. Managing and enforcing costs is the cost of ensuring
compliance with the other party within the contract. The Defense Industry and the
Government face all of these forms of costs. For example, the Government has to
conduct market research prior to selecting a contractor, this is a form of search and
information cost, and the contractor has to search which market segment it wishes
to pursue. Both the Government and defense contractors engage in negotiations;
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this is a form of bargaining costs. Finally, the Government has to also manage the
contractor. This can also increase costs to the Government the more contractors
they have to manage, in addition, this can increase transaction costs to the defense
contractor to have to comply with oversight and in turn flow down contract
management to its suppliers. Thus, if this is the case, BBP can have a negative
impact on cost reduction for the Government if the savings in production costs do
not exceed the contracting costs, which could increase or decrease as a result of
BBP and therefore countering the purpose of the program.
The concept of transaction cost economics originated with Coase (1937) in
his paper The Nature of the Firm. In his seminal work, Coase (1937) argued that
transaction costs were more than merely paying for the good or service, but
included search and information costs, the cost of bargaining, the cost of
maintaining intellectual property, and costs of policing and enforcement. However,
transaction cost concepts can be dated back to Commons’s (1931), where he argued
that the basis of economics is the idea of transactions, a means of exchange
between one party over the other party is the basic unit of economic analysis.
While Coase (1937) did not officially coin the term “transaction cost” in his work,
Williamson (1981) is credited with coining and popularizing the term in which he
argues that transaction costs deal with the costs of doing business between firms
and markets, as well as internal transactions such as employee relations. Because
uncertainty can be a transaction cost, Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) argued that
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based on the literature, organizations reduce transaction costs with their buyers by
establishing relationships of mutual interdependence. Thus, this is why the
Government seeks supplier pricing data, to reduce uncertainty and therefore lower
this form of transaction cost.
Looking at acquisition reform (BBP), it is important to investigate in what
ways are transaction costs impacted under this initiative. While it is the intent of
the Government to improve cost reduction, it is important to investigate how the
industry reacts. If the industry is impacted in a negative way, such as increases in
both time and effort within the contracting process, this could counter the whole
goal of acquisition reform in the first place, since these expenses will impact the
Government directly in the form of increased transaction costs.
According to Alexander (1992), there are unique transaction costs to the
Defense Industry because products and services are often co-created between
buyers and sellers. It is not uncommon for a weapon system to be developed by the
integration of private companies and the government. Such integration has
transaction costs associated with it. In addition, export and import controls, as well
as security clearances for defense contractors to work on such systems can be
costly to both the Government and the contractor.
According to Deutch (2001), the Department of Defense supported the
mergers and acquisitions of major defense contractors in order to consolidate the
defense industry and reduce the number of defense contractors to lower the cost of
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managing suppliers. However, the Government has since abandoned this approach
to reduce supplier power. Since the Government is able to control mergers through
anti-trust laws, countervailing power can be more challenging for suppliers as
opposed to fragmented buyers. Therefore, as mentioned, defense contractors
intending to collaborate have to steer clear of antitrust or perceived antitrust
violations. Thus, complementary products, teaming agreements, and joint
diversification can allow for collaboration with lower risk of anti-trust violations
(Brandenburger & Malebuff, 1998). Therefore, complementary products, teaming
agreements, and joint diversification can serve as a form of competitive
collaboration that can mitigate buyer power.
However, it should be noted that the Government could counter these tactics
by encouraging competition, according to Lyon (2006), the utilization of dual
sourcing can be beneficial to the Government as it reduces costs by allowing for
competition. However, dual sourcing can only be beneficial after the utilization of
a sole source incumbent who charges a high price and has delivered defective
products. The utilization of a dual source puts pressure on the incumbent through
competition. However, Lyon (2006) also notes that increasing competition on
advanced technology that requires heavy R&D expenditures can de-incentive a
contractor to incur such risk, thus hampering innovation (Steinbock, 2014).
Therefore, a sole source supplier, may be more incentivized or face future
competition, and thus may be more applicable for new specialized technologies that
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the Government may be pursing to meet its military strategy. As mentioned, a sole
source supplier could reduce management and enforcement costs since the
Government only would have to manage one supplier. Overall, impacts to
transaction costs are of concern to both the Government and the defense industry.
Reducing transaction costs is beneficial to both sides and can create a more
streamlined contracting process, which can reduce costs and get needed products
and services sold to meet Government demand.

Hypothesis 2: As a result of BBP, defense contractors will perceive
increases in costs and timeliness within the U.S. Government
contracting process.

Implications of H2.
If Hypothesis 2 is supported, then it would appear that monopsonistic
influence, through acquisition reform, is able to have an impact on costs within the
contracting process for the Defense Industry. If costs have increased, for either
party, then this can be indicative of potential harm. The increases may be onesided, in that the Government may experience increased costs, or the Defense
Industry is experiencing increased costs. If either or both is the case, then both
parties can benefit from this study in that it can shed light on the harmful effects of
BBP and could set the stage for further research which can extend to either repeated
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studies within the Defense Industry or other industries with monopsonistic buyers
influencing their acquisition process. Thus, this can assist the Government and the
Defense Industry in strategy development or further reforms if further studies
warrant it.
If Hypothesis 2 is not supported, this too can still have practical
implications for the Government and the Defense Industry. This can be indicative
that BBP has had no significant effect on contracting costs. Thus, this can indicate
the possibility that the program has not been effective in changing the contracting
process, which may warrant a change needed in the program. Alternatively, if costs
have decreased for the Government/Defense Industry, then this can have practical
implications as well. This, in turn, would indicate the possibility that BBP has been
beneficial and could warrant further reforms to capitalize on its potential success or
even create plans to replicate the process in other monopsonistic markets. The
following section synthesizes the concepts discussed and outlines the remainder of
the study.
Synthesis
Typically, acquisition reform has been a cost-focused concept, brought on
by political pressures (Hanks, Axelband, Lindsay, Malik, & Steele, 2005). Cancian
(1995), from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, argued that political
pressures are often what drive acquisition reform. Thus, countervailing power in
the form of pluralism is critical for having an influence on future reforms. Cancian
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(1995) argued that, like other industries, the Defense Industry’s goal is to make a
profit, in contrast to other industries; the Defense Industry has significantly more
oversight and is subject to increased amounts of auditors, inspectors, and
contracting officers managing the industry. Linking to transaction costs, such
oversight has a significant impact on governing the contracting process. Based on
Williamson (1979), relational contracting applies significantly to the Defense
Industry; thus, such relations can be impacted by programs such as BBP.
According to Ng, Maull, and Yip (2009), contracting types within the Defense
Industry has been steadily moving to performance-based contracts.
Performance-based contracts are consistent with one of the goals of BBP in
that it seeks to award contractors for successful outcomes within program
execution, however; such a shift can impact the Government contracting process
between the U.S. Government and the defense contractor. If this contract flow is
impacted, it could have an impact on the contracting costs due to the changing
arrangement.
Looking at Porter (1980), the Government as a Buyer has a lot of power
over the Defense Industry utilizing its regulatory capabilities and even unilateral
contracting capabilities. An example of such a unilateral capability is the case of
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, where the Government was able to bypass
negotiations and enforce a unilateral contract mod reducing the price of the contract
by millions (Erwin, 2016). Grundman (2010) argued that while the U.S.
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Government has a monopsony over the Defense Industry, and while it may be wise
from the Government’s perspective to want to enhance its buyer power even more,
such changes can cause burdens on defense contractors that could inadvertently
affect innovation. Such a burden, Grundman (2010) called “the Monopsonist’s
Dilemma,” this dilemma is caused by encroachment of profits through risky fixedprice incentive contracts for defense contractors. Such encroachment on profits and
demands for lower costs could de-incentivize defense contractors and thus reduce
their incentive to invest in research and development.

Hypothesis 3: BBP’s implementation has resulted in stagnant or
decreases in innovation in the long run within the Defense Industry.

Implications of H3.
If Hypothesis 3 is supported, then this could indicate that BBP has led to
stagnant innovation or possibly hindering innovation and in the long run, it can be
expected that defense contractors spend less in Research and Development, which
could harm defense technology development. If this is the case, this would go
contrary to the current National Defense Strategy (Unclassified Version) of the
United States which one of its main focus items is to maintain American
technological innovation in both the public and private sectors (Mattis, 2018).
According to the National Security Strategy (Unclassified Version) of the United
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States, one of the main goals of maintaining national security is to be the lead in
research, technology, and innovation (Trump, 2017). Finally, the National Military
Strategy (Unclassified Version) of the United States argues that its greatest
competitive advantage is innovation and fostering this innovation is a top priority.
Therefore, it is in the Government’s best interest to create an acquisition process
that does not hinder innovation (Inboden, 2016), rather foster innovation (DoD,
2017).
Alternatively, if Hypothesis 3 is not supported, this could indicate that BBP
has led to a trend of innovation increasing. Perceived increases in innovation could
mean BBP may have been successful in incentivizing the defense industry to
innovate.
Final Thoughts.
As a form of mitigation for uncertainty in acquisition reform, defense
contractors have employed redeployment strategies as a way of capitalizing on their
resources when needed (Anand, 2004). A redeployment strategy is the process a
firm, in this case, a defense contractor, takes in realigning its resources after a
period of spending cuts by the United States Government. Anand (2004) states that
a redeployment strategy is often referred to as a ‘conversion’ in the defense context.
Thus, conversion is when a defense contractor converts its resources to commercial
purposes and chases commercial market opportunities. Diversification based on
leveraging the assets of the firm in entering into a new industry is one form of
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conversion” (Anand, 2004, p. 389). According to Anand & Singh (1997), a
redeployment strategy is a method defense contractors can utilize during budget
cuts in times when the Defense Industry is in decline. Redeployment occurs first
after the Government cuts defense spending, which forces defense contractors to
mothball their products and services. Once defense spending increases or
international and even commercial opportunities come forward, the defense
contractor will redeploy their products and services and attempt to sell to a
commercial market as a way to diversify and reduce dependency on defense sales
(Bellais & Guichard, 2006). Defense contractors can also utilize dual-use
technology (Molas-Gallart, 1997). Dual-use technology is technology that has both
civilian and defense applications, which allows defense contractors the flexibility to
switch between commercial and defense markets in response to acquisition reform
(Brandt, 1994). Therefore, reducing this dependency can be a form of mitigation of
monopsonistic power.

Hypothesis 4: Acquisition reform (BBP) could influence industry
incumbents to either exit the market or enter into commercial type
markets as a means of mitigating buyer power and diversifying their
revenue streams.
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Implications of H4.
If Hypothesis 4 is supported, then this could indicate that BBP has created a
trend in defense contractors diversifying their products and services as a means for
reducing risk. If Hypothesis 4 is not supported, then this could indicate that BBP
has had no effect on market exit or commercial entry.
Should defense contractors exit the market, this could decrease competition
and thus increase transaction costs for the Government due to increased
monopolistic power. Looking at Pluralism alongside transaction costs, North
(1990) argued that there are “Political Transaction Costs.” These are the costs of
shaping public policy, political decisions, and even government regulations. In the
case of the Defense Industry, if the industry decided it was necessary to make a
push for amendments to BBP, such political influence would be costly. Thus, the
industry would have to do a cost-benefit analysis to determine long-term impact.
Therefore, this study added to the industrial organization literature by looking into
how monopsonistic behavior, through acquisition reform, influences contractual
expenditures and how defense contractors are collaborating to strengthen their
position. If defense contractors are engaging in competitive collaboration (coopetition), it is important to note in what ways or if defense contractors are
collaborating, and how this collaboration has influenced the Government. These
methods by the industry are further detailed in Chapters 4 and 5.

43

Below is an illustration of the links between the key theories and concepts utilized
in this study. Bargaining power is the medium of influence in that BBP intends to
enhance the U.S. Government position contractually (Carter, 2010) and
countervailing power (Galbraith, 1954) is a means of circumventing this position
due to its impacts on transaction costs:
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Figure 2 IO Theoretical Matrix
U.S. Government/Arms
Market
Monopsonist
Acquistion Reform
(BBP)

Impact to
Transaction
Costs (Contract
Costs)

Bargaining
Power of Buyers
and Sellers

Countervailing
Power
Oligopony

Defense Industry

Legend:
Green: Medium of Influence
Orange: Government Influence
Blue: Industry Response
Overall, the above figure is a framework designed to show the position of both
parties, the Defense Industry being an oligopoly and the Arms Market (U.S.
Government) being a monopsony. The Government employs acquisition reform
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(BBP in this case) to enhance its bargaining position and the Defense Industry
utilizes countervailing power to enhance its bargaining position.
The following chapter lays out the methodology utilized with the intent of
analyzing how BBP impacts contracting expenditures and competitive
collaboration between defense contractors via a survey study from the NCMA and
the NDIA associations. All of the hypotheses are broken down and explained in
detail in Chapter 3 as to how the study was conducted in order to find support for
these conjectures.
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Chapter 3 Methodology
Research Design
Quantitative Descriptive Statistics.
The study employed exploratory research (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005), in
the form of a survey analysis via exploratory and descriptive statistics design
methodology (Render, Stair, Hanna, & Hale, 2015). The intent to utilize
descriptive statistics is to examine the effects of Better Buying Power (BBP) and its
relation to its impacts to the industry in four measures: Competitive Collaboration,
Contract Costs, Innovation, and Commercial Diversification.
Qualitative Grounded Theory.
While the study used primarily quantitative descriptive statistics, it also
used a qualitative grounded theory method by coding open-ended responses, in
order to examine common themes as well as other findings of importance that were
not being directly measured in order to influence the development of the supplier
portion of countervailing power as a framework provided in Chapter 5.
Mixed Methods.
Thus, this study employs a mixed methodology. According to Johnson
(2001), descriptive statistics is a form of non-experimental research. This means
that causality can only be implied through theory or logic, when considering the
relationship between BBP (independent variable) and expenses in the contracting
process (dependent variable) as well as industry response, in the form of
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countervailing power (dependent variable) (Chen, 2003) by the Defense Industry,
perceived innovation (dependent variable), and commercial diversification
(dependent variable). Therefore, the quantitative portion and the qualitative portion
can complement one another by examining specific findings, while leaving room
for other findings through the coding process discussed below.
Mixed Methods Concurrent Triangulation.
Since both the quantitative portion and qualitative portion were done in
parallel and analyzed separately with both the findings discussed in Chapter 4 and
cross-analyzed in Chapter 5, this study utilized a concurrent triangulation approach
(Creswell & Clark, 2017). Such an approach uses quantitative and qualitative
methods independently during the study and then examines both findings to
compare data after the data collection is complete.
Sampling Design.
A representative sample was obtained from the following two trade
associations: the NCMA and the NDIA. These associations represent both defense
contracting and the Defense Industry as a whole. In addition, these associations
serve as the voices of the industry to the Government and vice-versa, in that they
seek Government influence (as per pluralism) and have an extensive background in
contracting and defense research. Thus, surveys with these representatives allowed
this study to gain insight as to how perceived contractual costs are being affected
by acquisition reform, as well as how the industry is responding.
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Exploratory and Action Research Design.
Survey questions focused on how perceived contracting costs and the
industry’s response to these reforms are affected. The surveys relied on the
experiences that acquisition and contracts professionals have had with acquisition
reform and BBP to investigate the impact to perceived contractual costs and how
the Defense Industry is collaborating in response to these reforms. Therefore,
looking at acquisition reform from a contractual cost standpoint, in addition to
examining the industry’s response to these reforms allowed the study to examine
impacts to perceived transaction costs. The findings assisted in providing guidance
to strategy development for the Defense Industry and the Government and the
interpretation from the data assisted in providing a framework by which to apply
these findings to other industries that have a monopsonistic buyer. This framework
is provided in Chapter 5.
Finally, this study employed an action research approach when utilizing the
results of the survey study. According to James, Slater, and Bucknam (2012),
action research is a type of research approach that utilizes data gathering in order to
find solutions from the results. Krathwohl and Smith (2004) argued that action
research is a type of research approach that intends to create some level of impact
that has practical implications. Therefore, this study examined the managerial
implications in conjunction with the theoretical contributions, to assist in strategy
development for firms in monopsonistic market type scenarios. The purpose of
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employing action research is to focus on what Bensimon, Polkinghorne, Bauman,
and Vallejo (2004) argued for closing the gap between theory and practice.
Therefore, in addition to adding to the literature, this study also provided
managerial implications.
Organization of the Remainder of this Chapter
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. The following sections discuss
the population and sample sizes, how the participants have been selected, types of
instruments used for the study, procedures for the study, and how the data has been
collected. These sections go over the variables and tools utilized for the study. The
following section discusses how the data was analyzed for the findings that resulted
from this study. The next section discusses the ethical considerations of the
research taking into account the requirements of approval by the Institutional
Review Board (IRB). The following section then discusses the Researcher’s
personality; this section goes over the background of the Principal Researcher. The
final sections of Chapter 3 discuss the validly and trustworthiness of the study as
well as the limitations and front-end summary.
Population and Sample
As mentioned, the samples have been pulled from two associations that
include surveys from the NDIA and the NCMA. The total collective population of
the two associations that are members, focusing on Defense Industry and
Government contracting issues, is 45,000 members. These members are inclusive
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of defense contractor professionals and Government employees. Utilizing a sample
size calculation from SurveyMonkey.com, with a population of 45,000, a
confidence interval of 95 percent, and a margin of error of 10 percent, the
recommended sample size is 96 participants.
Also, according to Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005), the below formula was used to
assist in determining the sample size:
( -

=

96.04 =

) ∗
(

∗ (1 −
)

)

(1.96) ∗ 0.5 ∗ (1 − 0.5)
(0.10)

In addition, according to Smith and Albaum (2005), with any population size, a
reliability measure of 95 percent, a Z-value of 1.96, a Standard Deviation of 0.5 (as
a default), and a precision of plus or minus 10 percent, the sample size should be
96.
Therefore, this study reached out and extracted responses with the intent of
reaching out to a minimum of 96 survey respondents. Note, that there was a total
of 97 actual respondents in this study.
Appendix C provides profiles of the population and sample breakdowns of
the Defense Industry, the Arms Manufacturing Market, and the three major defense
contractors that are representative of the Defense Industry based on high market
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shares (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman). Appendix C is
intended to be used as a reference point and to be used to show the position of the
Arms Market and the Defense Industry as well as background information that was
extracted when the proposal portion of this study commenced, which was in 2015.
The NDIA and the NCMA were selected because they are representative of
the Defense Industry and the Arms Market (NDIA, 2017) as well as Government
contracting as a whole, (NCMA, 2015). These associations were also selected
because they have knowledge of the acquisition process as well as acquisition
reform, and because of their role as trade associations that provide top-level
representation of the Defense Industry and Government acquisition professionals.
Because of these factors, these associations would be able to provide much insight
as to how monopsonistic behavior impacts the industry. Survey respondents were
selected from representatives of the two mentioned associations that have
experience in government contracting and Defense Industry experience. The intent
was to reach out to representatives from the Government and the Defense Industry
who have had experience within the contracting proposal and negotiation process.
In a proposal process, this typically includes functions such as Program
Management, Contracts, Finance, and Procurement. The purpose of selecting
representatives who have had some experience in one of these fields is because
they have direct interaction between the end users in the acquisition process and
thus were familiar with acquisition reform’s impacts, negotiations, and contracting.
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Since typically contracts are negotiated as a team effort, it was essential to
investigate how BBP has influenced Government contracting costs and its effect on
industry strategy.
Measured Variables and Data Analysis
Variables.
Independent Variable.
BBP is the independent variable due to the fact that as one of the latest
series in acquisition reform, it is intended to cause change.
Dependent Variables.
Perceived increases in competitive collaboration is the first dependent
variable based on the anticipated increases from Hypothesis 1. Perceived contract
costs is the second dependent variable because it is anticipated to rise as a result of
BBP and thus change based on Hypothesis 2. These costs are perceived because
since contract cost data increase is often considered proprietary by defense
contractors, obtaining actual cost data would not be feasible. Therefore,
perceptions of cost changes were gathered from the survey data from
representatives from NCMA and NDIA based on their experiences.
Perceived decreases in innovation is the third dependent variable in support
of Hypothesis 3. Finally, perceived increases in commercial diversification is the
fourth dependent variable in support of Hypothesis 4. Note that the dependent
variables were measured via separate measured outcomes based on (Render, Stair,
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Hanna, & Hale, 2015) and (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005) comparing before and
after BBP’s implementation by analyzing the means. The analysis utilized four
separate T-Tests to determine if there is support for the Hypotheses.
Procedures
Instruments utilized were to facilitate the survey analysis. SurveyMonkey
served as the data collection instrument. The purpose of this site is to assist in
survey generation and collection of raw data. SPSS analyzed the quantitative
portion of the study by analyzing the raw data from the closed-ended responses via
T-Tests and then the descriptive statistics were laid out and discussed. The
qualitative portion of the study was conducted from the open-ended responses
using a grounded theory method based on Bernard and Ryan (2010) qualitative
process by doing the following: Coding the data, gathering the coded responses into
concepts, categorizing those concepts, and then laying out the key themes to assist
in furthering the IO theory. In addition to manual coding, NVivo was also utilized
to code only the open-ended question responses within the survey. NVivo was able
to assist in identifying patterns to these question responses and provided an
organized coding process that assisted in the research findings as support
information by examining the themes present.
Below is a list of the selection and exclusion criteria for the surveys. The
intent of these choices was to reach out to only a U.S. based population that had
experience with acquisition reform in order to focus the study.
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Selection criteria.
Surveys were open to the individuals who meet the following criteria:
•

Currently or previously a U.S. Defense Industry or U.S. Government
employee

•

A member of the defense acquisition process (i.e., Contracts, Procurement,
Finance, and Program Management)

•

A member of NCMA/NDIA

•

Familiar with BBP and Acquisition Reform (Definitions of both were
provided in the survey)
Exclusion Criteria.

•

Employee of a Foreign Government or an employee of a Non-U.S. defense
contractor regardless of employee citizenship

•

Employee of a commercial (non-defense contractor) regardless if it is
domestic or international and regardless of citizenship

•

Not a member of NCMA/NDIA
Protocol.

•

Survey requests were released to NCMA and NDIA charter leader
distributions, with a snowball sampling method of having the charter
leaders reach out to their charter members due to the fact that the Principal
Researcher did not have direct access to these individuals.
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•

Surveys included 29 items in a Likert-type format as well as open-ended
items (16 Likert-type items (Scale of 1 to 7) and 4 open-ended items). In
addition, there were 9 pre-screen questions.

•

Question 1 of the survey was the consent authorization and question 2 was
the inclusion criteria confirmation. If a respondent responded “No” to
either or both of these questions, they were not included in the study and the
SurveyMonkey system automatically moved them to the disqualification
page.

•

Definitions of BBP and acquisition reform, as well as the purpose of the
study, were provided before the questions

•

Information on sensitive information was provided (see Ethical
Considerations section below for more details)

All items were required to be answered, SurveyMonkey had controls in place that
allows for requiring to answer a question in order to proceed. These controls were
included in the open-ended questions as well.
Measured Outcomes.
Items 11 through 14 of the survey assisted in investigating Hypothesis 1 and
items 15 through 19 of the survey assisted in investigating Hypothesis 2. In
addition, items 20 through 24 assisted in investigating Hypothesis 3 and items 25
through 29 assisted in investigating Hypothesis 4.
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Note that Appendix D provides a layout of the perceptions of the respondents in the
form of recurring themes.
Open-Ended Questions for both Perceived Contractual Costs and
Perceived Competitive Collaboration.
For the open-ended questions, these responses were coded via the Nvivio
software to look for patterns in responses and recurring themes. While there was
no way to predict the participant’s response to these questions, below are some of
the key themes that this study examined. The data findings have been included in
the Chapter 4 (Findings).
Perceived Themes by Hypothesis prior to Data Collection
•

Increased costs (H1)

•

Price Impact (H1)

•

Profitability (H1)

•

Federal Budget (H1)

•

Bureaucracy (H1)

•

Influence (H2)

•

Political Landscape or Government Relations (H2)

•

Collaboration (H2)

•

Mergers (H2)

•

Relations or Relationship (H2)

•

Innovation (H3)
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•

Divestment or Exit (H4)

The above themes contain items that were proposed as potential findings prior
to data collection. Chapter 4 contains the updated themes by Hypothesis based
on the actual data collected.
Note: Appendix E contains the survey questions.
Ethical Considerations
Due to the sensitivity of the nature of the work conducted within the
Defense Industry, specific parameters were taken into account. Survey participants
were instructed not to divulge proprietary, classified, foreign government classified,
export/import-controlled, and competition sensitive, personal, or otherwise
sensitive information. The survey participant’s identities remain anonymous. This
information was provided in the survey instructions prior to beginning the
questions. After the surveys were completed, if it were determined that sensitive
information was inadvertently released, this information would have been redacted
from the documentation; however, this did not occur. These instructions were
provided in the survey instructions.
In addition, training from the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative
(CITI) in the form of courses that include Conflicts of Interest, Humanities
Responsible Conduct of Research, Social & Behavioral Research, and Social and
Behavioral Responsible Conduct of Research were completed to prepare the
Principal Researcher to conduct ethical and responsible research on human
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subjects. Finally, research was only conducted after receiving proposal approval by
the FIT committee and after receiving approval by the Institutional Review Board
(IRB) to conduct the study.
Researcher Positionality
The Principal Researcher of this study is also currently a Contracts
Professional at Lockheed Martin, thus a part of the proposal process and proposal
teams. As a Contracts Negotiator for the largest defense contractor in the world,
the Principle Researcher can relate to the study having worked in the field.
Because of this background, the Researcher has had direct experiences with U.S.
Government acquisition reform, BBP, and how negotiations and sales have been
affected by these initiatives. During the Researcher’s tenure at Lockheed Martin,
sequestration, acquisition reform, and BBP has been significant topics and concerns
influencing the decision-making process of both the Researcher, the company, and
the industry as a whole. These experiences have both assisted in generating the
research questions as well as refining the research questions.
While the Researcher was not directly connected to the outcome of this
study, the topic, its outcome, and its findings are of interest to the Researcher for
the purpose of understanding industry best practices and how to better understand
in what ways can industry to Government relations improve. Also, the findings are
of significant importance to the Researcher since the Researcher hoped to gain
knowledge in the field to better improve negotiations to create win-win scenarios
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for the company and the customer, primarily the U.S. Government. Because of
these experiences and because of the concerns acquisition reform has had both on
the Defense Industry and Lockheed Martin, the Researcher hoped to understand
better the benefits to these initiatives for both the Defense Industry and the
Government and what are the challenges for both sides as well. By having a better
understanding of these initiatives, the Researcher hoped to be able to obtain the
knowledge and capabilities to be able to put theory into practice.
Validity and Trustworthiness
Responses from the survey participants contained some subjective and even
biased information that cannot be controlled. In an attempt to mitigate these issues
as much as possible, survey questions had a combination of closed-ended (Likert)
and open-ended questions. Yin (2009) mentions that there are four types of validly
for an empirical study.
Construct Validity: This type of validity deals with the understanding of
what is being measured, how it is being measured, and if what is being measured is
what the researcher thinks one is measuring. In this case, through the literature
review and surveys, these methods assisted in establishing validity in this study.
The literature sets the groundwork for applicable theories; the surveys allowed the
researcher to discuss perceived contractual costs from industry trade associations as
well as investigated how industry members are responding to these changes. One
thing to note, it was not the intent of this study to determine causation. Since
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correlation does not equal causation, this study investigated if there is a relationship
between acquisition reform and its effects on perceived contractual costs, as well as
if and how is the Defense Industry collaborating in response to these reforms.
Thus, the intent of this study was to examine if this warrants future research.
Internal Validity: This type of validly focuses on matching patterns and
building explanations. Utilizing open-ended questions within the survey has
allowed the respondents a chance to respond beyond the limitations of closedended items and allowed the ability to examine if any key patterns exist. For
example, when certain statements and phrases were made by the survey
respondents, this assisted in laying out patterns that could investigate how
acquisition reform and monopsonistic behavior is affecting the industry. Note that
according to Yin (2009), Internal Validity only applies to causal type research, thus
would not apply to exploratory/descriptive research, such as this study. Thus, this
type of validity only serves as a benchmark for future casual research that could
arise from this study.
External Validity: External Validity focuses on using theory to examine if
the findings are generalizable to the Defense Industry and Arms Market population.
By reaching out to two different nation-wide associations, one focusing on federal
contract management and the other on defense industry to market representation, as
well as reaching out to both industry and Government representatives, this
approach intended to increase generalizability to other industries with
61

monopsonies. Such as industries in other countries which experience high buyer
power due to regulation.
Reliability: Based on Yin (2009), if such results are repeatable, it can then
add to the validity of the results. Utilizing two different industry associations, via
multiple survey responses can provide the opportunity for examining other
industries with powerful buyers. The ability to repeat the study will allow for
further reliability and furtherance of future research. The reliability of this study is
thus dependent on the internal consistency of the bipolar measured dependent
variables.
Limitations of the Study
Because the scope of the study is limited to the Defense Industry and only
defense contractors within the United States, these are potential limitations in that
results from the study could differ in other industries or outside of the United
States. Finally, this study is focusing on perceptions from industry representatives
as opposed to actuals. Perceptions are used due to the fact that actual data cannot
be directly extracted from defense contractors or the Government due to the
potential of proprietary information risks. Thus, perceptions do not guarantee the
same results, but still allow for a better understanding of BBP’s impact for an
exploratory based study.
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Summary of the Dissertation Front-End
Finally, while this research focused on the Defense Industry with respect to
a monopsonistic buyer, the research can be applied to the academic literature and in
other industries that face monopsonies.
This study intended to add to the business field of industrial organization by
further exploring the industry structure of buyers and examining trends within an
industry utilizing countervailing power to influence monopsonistic power. It is the
intent of this study to benefit academia and have practical implications that could
potentially benefit industries that face monopsonistic buyers by creating a
framework from the results of the study to assist firms in industries outside of the
Defense Industry with similar market structures. In addition, this study can provide
additional managerial implications in understanding the tradeoffs of execution costs
and transaction costs as a result of BBP (Tama, 2018).
It was the intent of Chapters 1, 2, and 3 to layout the research proposal, the
research path, supporting literature, and how the research intended to be conducted.
The back-end of the paper, Chapters 4 and 5 serve as the results and interpretation
of the study. The following chapter, Chapter 4, documents what occurred and
contains the findings. Interpretation of these findings is covered in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 contains the conclusions that resulted from the findings; this chapter also
identifies the implications of the study and what future potential research can result
from this study.
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Chapter 4 Findings
Overview
The intent of this study was to examine monopsonistic influence on the
Defense Industry. To accomplish this, the study focused on acquisition reform
utilizing Betting Buying Power (BBP) as the vehicle for an exploratory researchbased study.
In order to accomplish this, the study first laid out four research questions:
1. How does monopsonistic behavior, through acquisition reform, influence
perceived contract costs?
Based on the findings, the study showed that there is perceptions of
increased contract costs.
2. How does monopsonistic behavior, through acquisition reform, impact
innovation in the long term?
Based on the study, there is support that there is perceptions of decreased
innovation as a result of BBP.
3. How is countervailing power being utilized within the Defense Industry as a
result of monopsonistic influence through acquisition reform?
Based on the study, there is support that shows perceptions of industry
employing increased competitive collaboration and pluralistic influence as a
result of BBP.
4. How has acquisition reform influenced commercial diversification?
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Based on the study, there is support that shows perceptions of increased
commercial diversification as a result of BBP.
The below findings section goes into more detail as to the evidence for
support of these responses.
The study then laid out Industrial Organization as the theoretical framework
(Jacquemin, 1987), with transaction costs (Williamson, 1979) and pluralism
(Connolly, 1995) as supporting theories from the literature. In order to position the
study, four hypotheses were identified to support the research questions.

H1: As a result of BBP, defense contractors will demonstrate perceived
increases in competitive collaboration with each other in order to
circumvent monopsonistic buyer power of the government.
Overall there was support for H1.
H2: As a result of BBP, defense contractors will perceive increases in costs
and timeliness within the U.S. Government contracting process.
Overall there was support for H2.
H3: BBP’s implementation has resulted in stagnant or decreases in
perceived innovation in the long run within the Defense Industry.
Overall there was support for H3.
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H4: Acquisition reform (BBP) could influence industry incumbents to either
exit the market or enter into commercial type markets as a means of
mitigating buyer power and diversifying their revenue streams.
H4A: As a result of BBP, there are perceptions of fewer incumbents
within the Defense Industry.
H4B: As a result of BBP, there are perceived increases in
commercial diversification.
Overall there was support for H4, H4A, and H4B.
The Hypothesis acceptance criteria was as follows via response means in the survey
results:
H1 Supported if < 4
H2 Supported if < 4
H3 Supported if > 4
H4, H4A, and H4B Supported if < 4
Four (4) was used as the baseline since this is the neutral number in the Likert
scale. A mean of four (4) indicates no change. Thus, based on the Hypothesis, a
mean other than four (4) would indicate the respondents leaned to one side or
another based on the respective hypothesis. It is important to note that H3
acceptance criteria’s polarity was reversed, this was due to the fact that for these
survey questions, disagreements with the responses showed support for the
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Hypothesis, as opposed to agreements for the other Hypotheses. The intent of this
was to avoid bias by reversing the survey questions in order to see if the
respondents weren’t just agreeing with all the questions, which the responses show
that this was not the case. There were many responses that showed strong
disagreements.
The Findings section provides a detailed analysis of the Hypotheses and support for
these Hypotheses.
The following section will lay out the research findings in relation to the
hypotheses and research questions. The next section in this chapter will then
synthesize the data and the final section will provide an overview of the
implications of the findings, which will then be further analyzed in Chapter 5.
Research Findings
Layout.
This section will show the results of the close-ended pre-screen items,
followed by the themes of the open-ended pre-screen items, and then by both the
close-ended and open-ended items for Hypotheses 1 through 4. All items were
extracted from SurveyMonkey (2018), the close-ended items were analyzed via
SPSS (2017) and the open-ended items were analyzed via NVivo (2017).
Note: That questions 1 and 2 show 100 percent of the respondents saying “Yes” to
both questions. This is due to the fact that the survey was set up to automatically
excluded all respondents from the study who responded “No” to either or both
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questions. The exclusion was due to the fact that the respondent is indicating they
do not consent to the study, or they do not meet the inclusion criteria discussed in
Chapter 3, respectively.
Pre-screen Questions.
Questions 1 and 2 had a 100 percent confirmation that the respondents agreed to
participate and that they met the required criteria. Note, this was due to the fact
that SurveyMonkey excluded respondents who did not consent or did not meet the
inclusion criteria.
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Q3 Please confirm if you are a member of NCMA or NDIA:
Frequency
Valid

I am a member of

Percent

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

43

44.3

44.3

44.3

I am a member of NDIA

35

36.1

36.1

80.4

I am a member of Both

19

19.6

19.6

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

NCMA

Q4 I am a ______.
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Other (please specify)

20

20.6

20.6

20.6

U.S. Department of

16

16.5

16.5

37.1

61

62.9

62.9

100.0

97

100.0

100.0

Defense Employee.
U.S. Defense Contractor
Employee
Total

Note that for respondents that responded “Other,” common occupations included
the following:
•

Legal Consultant

•

Advisors

•

Retirees

•

Educators

•

Research Employees

•

Acquisition Employees
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It is also important to note that some respondents who answered “Other” as their
fill-in responses could be classified as the either Defense Contractor employees or
DoD employees.

Q5 Approximately how long have you been employed in your
current position?
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

0-2 Years

16

16.5

16.5

16.5

3-5 Years

17

17.5

17.5

34.0

6-8 Years

15

15.5

15.5

49.5

Greater than 8

49

50.5

50.5

100.0

97

100.0

100.0

Years
Total

Q6 How familiar are you with Acquisition Reform?
AR Familiarity
Cumulative
Frequency Percent
Valid

Valid Percent

Percent

Familiar

71

73.2

73.2

73.2

Neutral

22

22.7

22.7

95.9

4

4.1

4.1

100.0

97

100.0

100.0

Not Familiar
Total

Overall, most respondents were familiar with acquisition reform, with only a small
amount being unfamiliar. 22.7 percent felt neutral in this response; this may be due
in part that while they have some experience in acquisition reform, their specific
programs or jobs have not dealt with it directly.
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Q7 How familiar are you with Better Buying Power?
BBP Familiarity
Cumulative
Frequency Percent
Valid

Valid Percent

Percent

Familiar

65

67.0

67.0

67.0

Neutral

25

25.8

25.8

92.8

7

7.2

7.2

100.0

97

100.0

100.0

Not Familiar
Total

Overall, over two thirds of the respondents stated they were familiar with BBP.
However, 25.8 percent of the respondents stated they were only somewhat familiar
and 7.2 stated they had little familiarity. This could be due to the fact that some
respondents had less experience in the field seeing as there were approximately one
third of respondents with less than 5 years of experience.

Group Statistics
How familiar are you

Std. Error

Deviation

Mean

with Better Buying Power?

N

Collaborate (4 item

Familiar

66 3.3258

1.21289

.14930

avg)

Not Familiar

31 3.3145

1.02259

.18366

Cost (4 item avg)

Familiar

66 3.6098

1.10430

.13593

Not Familiar

31 3.5242

.79675

.14310

Innovate (4 item

Familiar

66 4.6553

1.44233

.17754

avg)

Not Familiar

31 4.8952

1.30508

.23440

Diversification (4

Familiar

66 3.2121

1.22415

.15068

item avg)

Not Familiar

31 3.2097

1.05494

.18947

71

Mean

Std.

For this item, two groups were created, those familiar with BBP and those not
familiar with BBP. Overall, the means of both groups supported all four
hypotheses and showed little differences.
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Q8 Irrespective of my opinion on Better Buying Power (BBP), I
believe BBP has been successful in what it has stated it has
intended to do. See definition of BBP above or view the following
link for more info on BBP: http://bbp.dau.mil/
BBP Success
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

35

36.1

36.1

36.1

Undecided

20

20.6

20.6

56.7

Disagree

42

43.3

43.3

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Group Statistics
Std. Error

Deviation

Mean

I am a ______.

N

BBP

U.S. Department of Defense

16 2.6250

1.45488

.36372

Success

Employee.
61 4.4262

1.39593

.17873

U.S. Defense Contractor
Employee
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Mean

Std.

Independent Samples Two-Tailed T-Test (Significance)
Levene’
s Test
for
Equality
of
Varianc
es

t-test for Equality of Means
Sig.
Si

BBP

Equal

Success

variances

F

g.

.04

.8

9 25

T

df
- 75
5

Equal

- 22

not

95% Confidence

(2-

Mean

Error

Interval of the

taile

Differen

Differen

Difference

d)

ce

ce

Lower

Upper

.000 -1.80123

.39546

-2.58902

-1.01344

.000 -1.80123

.40526

-2.64001

-.96245

4.55

assumed

variances

Std.

4.44

.7

5 87

assumed

When comparing responses from DoD Government employees and employees of
the Defense Industry, Government employees felt that BBP has been successful as
opposed to Industry employees who feel that BBP has been unsuccessful.

Below are the coded themes, elements, and sentiments for the open-ended portion
of this item. Coded items were both auto-coded in NVivo and manual coded,
common themes that appeared in both coding processes are provided Appendix F.
Chapter 5 lays out the interpretation of the key themes that appeared in the survey.
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Major Themes:
The below are the major themes found in the survey for this item:
•

Little Change

•

Excessive Regulation

•

Metrics Needed

•

Difficult to change

•

Negative Trend

See Appendix F for a chart listing the raw findings for this question.
Nvivo detected a 60.87 percent negative sentiment to 39.13 percent positive
sentiment. Note that sentiments measure overall feelings by the respondents. The
strong negative reactions to this response are in sync with the close-ended and
open-ended portions of this response. Overall, while split, respondents felt that
BBP has not been successful in its intended purpose, with 43.3 percent. However,
there is some support by the respondents that feel that BBP succeeded in its
intended purpose, with a percent of 36.07. In addition, 20.62 percent of the
respondents were undecided. The reason for the split response may be perhaps how
the respondents are defining success. While the question asked for the perspective
of BBP and not based on opinion, with a mix of both Government and Industry
employees, differing groups may have defined BBP success differently.
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Q9 In regards to Better Buying Power, I feel that I am
__________ in making an informative assessment of its impacts
to the Defense Industry based on my experience with the
program.
Informed Assessment
Cumulative
Frequency Percent
Valid

Valid Percent

Percent

Confident

58

59.8

59.8

59.8

Neutral

27

27.8

27.8

87.6

Not Confident

12

12.4

12.4

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Hypothesis 1 Items.
H1: As a result of BBP, defense contractors will demonstrate perceived increases in
competitive collaboration with each other in order to circumvent monopsonistic
buyer power of the government.

Q10 Political Influence
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Agree

51

52.6

52.6

52.6

Undecided

36

37.1

37.1

89.7

Disagree

10

10.3

10.3

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0
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Valid Percent

Percent

Q11 Complementary
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

56

57.7

57.7

57.7

Undecided

18

18.6

18.6

76.3

Disagree

23

23.7

23.7

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Q12 M&A
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

56

57.7

57.7

57.7

Undecided

18

18.6

18.6

76.3

Disagree

23

23.7

23.7

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Q13 Collaboration
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

55

56.7

56.7

56.7

Undecided

19

19.6

19.6

76.3

Disagree

23

23.7

23.7

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Q14 Overall, how has Better Buying Power influenced Defense Industry political
investments, sales of complementary products/services, mergers and acquisitions,
and overall competitive collaboration?
77

Major Themes:
The below are the major themes found in the survey for this item:
•

Increased Consolidation

•

Increased Mergers

•

Higher Collaboration

•

Collective Influence

•

Increased Joint-Ventures

See Appendix F for a chart listing the raw findings for this question.

NVivo detected a 50.98 percent positive sentiment to 49.02 percent negative
sentiment.
Hypothesis 2 Items.
H2: As a result of BBP, defense contractors will perceive increases in costs and
timeliness within the U.S. Government contracting process.

Q15 Contract Costs
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Agree

54

55.7

55.7

55.7

Undecided

27

27.8

27.8

83.5

Disagree

16

16.5

16.5

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0
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Valid Percent

Percent

Q16 Timeliness
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

59

60.8

60.8

60.8

Undecided

16

16.5

16.5

77.3

Disagree

22

22.7

22.7

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Q17 Streamlined
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

56

57.7

57.7

57.7

Undecided

16

16.5

16.5

74.2

Disagree

25

25.8

25.8

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Q18 Efficiency
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

57

58.8

58.8

58.8

Undecided

18

18.6

18.6

77.3

Disagree

22

22.7

22.7

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Q19 Overall, based on your experience with acquisition reform, how has Better
Buying Power impacted the Government contracting process in the form of
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timeliness, efficiency, overall contracting costs, and streamlining the acquisition
process for defense products and services?
Major Themes:
The below are the major themes found in the survey for this item:
•

Costly Changes

•

Increased OTAs as a Contracting Vehicle

•

Inefficient Process

•

Less Streamlined

•

Less Improved

See Appendix F for a chart listing the raw findings for this question.
NVivo detected a 69.35 percent negative sentiment to 30.65 percent positive
sentiment. Based on the polarization of these reactions, it appears there are strong
negative reactions to this response. These reactions indicate strong feelings by the
respondents with regards to contract costs. Since BBP was focused on cost
reduction, it may explain the stronger reactions to this open-ended question than the
others.
Hypothesis 3 Items.
H3: BBP’s implementation has resulted in stagnant or decreases in perceived
innovation in the long run within the Defense Industry.
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Q20 R&D
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

19

19.6

19.6

19.6

Undecided

28

28.9

28.9

48.5

Disagree

50

51.5

51.5

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Q21 Innovation
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

20

20.6

20.6

20.6

Undecided

19

19.6

19.6

40.2

Disagree

58

59.8

59.8

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Q22 Developmental
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Agree

20

20.6

20.6

20.6

Undecided

28

28.9

28.9

49.5

Disagree

49

50.5

50.5

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0
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Valid Percent

Percent

Q23 New Technologies
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

22

22.7

22.7

22.7

Undecided

22

22.7

22.7

45.4

Disagree

53

54.6

54.6

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Q24 Overall, what do you see the impact Better Buying Power has had on in
investing in R&D, innovation, developmental contracts, or creation of new defense
technologies within the Defense Industry?
Major Themes:
The below are the major themes found in the survey for this item:
•

Less Innovation

•

Lower Development

•

Increased Utilization of Other Transaction Authority (OTAs)

•

Low Incentives

•

Unwillingness to invest by the Industry

See Appendix F for a chart listing the raw findings for this question.

NVivo detected a 58 percent negative sentiment to 42 percent positive sentiment.
Similar to the responses to changes in contract costs, innovation also showed strong
negative sentiments within the Hypothesis questions. These sentiments may be
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linked to the fact that BBP had innovation as one of its tenants, however
respondents feel that innovation has reduced or been stagnant at best.
Hypothesis 4 Questions
H4: Acquisition reform (BBP) could influence industry incumbents to either exit
the market or enter into commercial type markets as a means of mitigating buyer
power and diversifying their revenue streams. Note that items Q25 and Q28 are
measured in support of H4A and items Q26 and Q27 are in support of H4B.

Q25 Market Exit
Cumulative
Frequency Percent
Valid

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

48

49.5

49.5

49.5

Undecided

30

30.9

30.9

80.4

Disagree

19

19.6

19.6

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Q26 Commercial
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Agree

56

57.7

57.7

57.7

Undecided

23

23.7

23.7

81.4

Disagree

18

18.6

18.6

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0
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Valid Percent

Percent

Q27 Dual Use
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Agree

64

66.0

66.0

66.0

Undecided

22

22.7

22.7

88.7

Disagree

11

11.3

11.3

100.0

Total

97

100.0

100.0

Q28 Fewer Companies
Cumulative

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Agree

54

55.7

55.7

55.7

Undecided

35

36.1

36.1

91.8

8

8.2

8.2

100.0

97

100.0

100.0

Disagree
Total

Valid Percent

Percent

Q29 Overall, how has Better Buying Power influenced diversification? Such as
defense contractors exiting the arms market, expanding into commercial markets,
developing dual-use technologies, and the impact on the number of Defense
Industry incumbents, such as new competitors or small business participation.
Major Themes:
The below are the major themes found in the survey for this item:
•

Disruptive Technologies by Commercial Contractors

•

Status Quo of large contractors

•

Increases in dual-use technology
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•

Less smaller businesses

•

Less competition

See Appendix F for a chart listing the raw findings for this question.
NVivo detected a 56.86 percent negative sentiment to 43.14 percent positive
sentiment.
Synthesis and Summary of Data
The following are four separate T-Tests that were conducted for Hypotheses
1 through 4. The T-Test were only inclusive of the data from the closed-ended
questions.
Hypothesis 1.

One-Sample Statistics
N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Political Influence

97

3.3505

1.29133

.13111

Complementary Products

97

3.4227

1.48489

.15077

M&A

97

3.0619

1.41285

.14345

Competitive Collaboration

97

3.4536

1.47211

.14947

Collaborate (4 item avg)

97

3.3222

1.15016

.11678
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One-Sample Test
Test Value = 4
Sig.
t

95% Confidence Interval of the

(2-

Mean

df

tailed)

Difference

Difference
Lower

Upper

Political Influence

-4.954

96

.000

-.64948

-.9097

-.3892

Complementary

-3.829

96

.000

-.57732

-.8766

-.2780

M&A

-6.540

96

.000

-.93814

-1.2229

-.6534

Competitive

-3.656

96

.000

-.54639

-.8431

-.2497

-5.804

96

.000

-.67784

-.9096

-.4460

Products

Collaboration
Collaborate (4 item
avg)

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach’s Alpha N of Items
.896

5

Due to the fact that strongly agree is a “1” and strongly disagree is a “7”,
the expected mean value is a “4”. Thus, the Hypothesis can be accepted if the
mean is less than “4”. If the mean is greater than or equal to “4”, then the study
failed to reject the null. In this case, all four items and the average of the four had
means below “4”, thus there is support for Hypothesis 1.
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Hypothesis 2.
One-Sample Statistics
N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Contract Costs

97

3.1031

1.48243

.15052

Timeliness

97

3.1856

1.71592

.17423

Contracting Process

97

3.1649

1.68746

.17134

Contracting Efficiency

97

3.2474

1.61394

.16387

Cost (4 item avg)

97

3.5825

1.01276

.10283

One-Sample Test
Test Value = 4
95% Confidence Interval of the
Sig. (2-

Mean

tailed)

Difference

Difference

t

df

-5.959

96

.000

-.89691

-1.1957

-.5981

Timeliness

4.675

96

.000

.81443

-1.1603

-.4686

Contracting

-4.874

96

.000

-.83505

-1.1751

-.4950

Efficiency

-4.592

96

.000

-.75258

-1.0779

-.4273

Cost (4 item avg)

-4.060

96

.000

-.41753

-.6216

-.2134

Contract Costs

Lower

Upper

Process

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach’s Alpha N of Items
.763

5

Due to the fact that strongly agree is a “1” and strongly disagree is a “7”,
the expected mean value is a “4”. Thus, the Hypothesis can be accepted if the
mean is less than “4”. If the mean is greater than or equal to “4”, then the study
failed to reject the null. In this case, three of the four items and the average of the
four items had means below “4”, thus there is support for Hypothesis 2. Note the
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polarity of the second item in this Hypothesis measuring “Timeliness” is in reverse
and thus means above “4” shows support for the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3.
One-Sample Statistics
N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

R&D Investment

97

4.6907

1.48156

.15043

Innovation Increase

97

4.8351

1.54570

.15694

Development Contracts

97

4.6082

1.44739

.14696

New Defense Technology

97

4.7938

1.66419

.16897

Innovate (4 item avg)

97

4.7320

1.39766

.14191
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One-Sample Test
Test Value = 4
95% Confidence Interval of
t

df

Sig. (2-

Mean

tailed)

Difference

the Difference
Lower

Upper

R&D Investment

4.592 96

.000

.69072

.3921

.9893

Innovation Increase

5.321 96

.000

.83505

.5235

1.1466

Development

4.139 96

.000

.60825

.3165

.9000

New Tech Increase

4.698 96

.000

.79381

.4584

1.1292

Innovate (4 item

5.158 96

.000

.73196

.4503

1.0136

Contracts

avg)

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach’s Alpha N of Items
.958

5

Due to the fact that strongly agree is a “1” and strongly disagree is a “7”,
the expected mean value is a “4”. Thus, the Hypothesis can be accepted if the
mean is greater than or equal to “4”. If the mean is less than “4”, then the study
failed to reject the null. In this case, all four items and the average of the four had
means above “4”, thus there is support for Hypothesis 3.
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Hypothesis 4.
One-Sample Statistics
N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Exit Arms Market

97

3.4948

1.41512

.14368

Enter Commercial Market

97

3.2990

1.48018

.15029

Dual-Use Technology

97

2.9278

1.49476

.15177

Fewer Defense Companies

97

3.1237

1.32490

.13452

Diversification (4 item avg)

97

3.2113

1.16723

.11851

One-Sample Test
Test Value = 4

t

df

Sig.

95% Confidence Interval of

(2-

the Difference

tailed

Mean

)

Difference

Lower

Upper

Exit Arms Market

-3.516

96

.001

-.50515

-.7904

-.2199

Enter Commercial

-4.665

96

.000

-.70103

-.9994

-.4027

-7.064

96

.000

-1.07216

-1.3734

-.7709

-6.514

96

.000

-.87629

-1.1433

-.6093

-6.655

96

.000

-.78866

-1.0239

-.5534

Market
Dual-Use
Technology
Fewer Defense
Companies
Diversification (4
item avg)

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
.900

5

Due to the fact that strongly agree is a “1” and strongly disagree is a “7”,
the expected mean value is a “4”. Thus, the Hypothesis can be accepted if the
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mean is less than “4”. If the mean is greater than or equal to “4”, then the study
failed to reject the null. In this case, all four items and the average of the four had
means below “4”, thus there is support for Hypothesis 4.

Below is a Two-Tailed T-Test which split the respondents into two groups, one for
Government employees and the other for Industry employees, in order to see if
there are differences in their responses.

Group Statistics
Std. Error

Deviation

Mean

I am a ______.

N

Collaborate (4 item

U.S. Department of Defense

25 3.3700

.84816

.16963

avg)

Employee.
72 3.3056

1.24274

.14646

25 4.1600

1.03803

.20761

72 3.3819

.92972

.10957

25 4.0400

1.14036

.22807

72 4.9722

1.40519

.16560

25 3.7000

1.31498

.26300

72 3.0417

1.06975

.12607

U.S. Defense Contractor

Mean

Std.

Employee
Cost (4 item avg)

U.S. Department of Defense
Employee.
U.S. Defense Contractor
Employee

Innovate (4 item avg) U.S. Department of Defense
Employee.
U.S. Defense Contractor
Employee
Diversification (4 item U.S. Department of Defense
avg)

Employee.
U.S. Defense Contractor
Employee
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After splitting the data into two groups and analyzing the data via a TwoTailed T-Test, on all four Hypothesis categories, the Industry Employees showed
support for the Hypotheses. As for the Government employees, with the exception
of Hypothesis 2, on average, these respondents showed support for Hypotheses 1,
3, and 4.
Below is a summary of the means:
Table 1 Close-Ended Highlights

Closed-Ended Item
Q10
Q11
Q12
Q13
Average Collaboration
Q15
Q16
Q17
Q18
Average Costs
Q20
Q21
Q22
Q23
Average Innovation
Q25
Q26
Q27
Q28
Average Diverse

Mean Summary
P-Value
P-Value
Government
Industry
Government
Industry
3.2800
0.000
3.3750
0.000
3.5200
0.000
3.3889
0.000
3.1200
0.000
3.0417
0.000
3.5600
0.000
3.4167
0.000
3.3700
0.000
3.3056
0.000
3.7600
0.000
2.8750
0.000
4.2000
0.000
5.0278
0.000
4.1200
0.000
2.8333
0.000
4.5600
0.000
2.7917
0.000
4.1600
0.000
3.3819
0.000
4.0800
0.000
4.9028
0.000
4.1600
0.000
5.0694
0.000
4.0400
0.000
4.8056
0.000
3.8800
0.000
5.1111
0.000
4.0400
0.000
4.9722
0.000
4.0400
0.000
3.3056
0.000
3.9600
0.000
3.0694
0.000
3.3200
0.000
2.7917
0.000
3.4800
0.000
3.0000
0.000
3.7000
0.000
3.0417
0.000
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Highlighted in yellow are items that do not support the Hypothesis in their
respective category. In green highlight are areas that does support the Hypothesis
in its respective category.
Note for Q10, Q20, and Q25, respondents were, on average, split in their responses
with the highest percentage of neutral responses being higher than all other
responses of 37.1, 28.9, and 30.9 respectively. In addition, Q17 had an opposing
response rate of 25.7%, this split is due to differing opinions between Government
respondents and Industry respondents. For Q10, the reason for the split is likely
due to fact that some of the respondents are a mix of both Government and Industry
employees and may see political influence from a different perspective. For Q20,
this split may be due in part because of the administration change and its focus on
innovation, even though this study is strictly measuring BBP’s effects. For Q25
and Q28, this split is evident in the open-ended responses which indicate that there
are increases in companies exiting the industry as a result of acquisition reform,
these exits are more likely to occur for small businesses. With the exception of
contract costs, overall Government and Industry responses are in agreement. The
reason for the disagreement of contract costs may be perspective. Government may
feel they are getting improved costs at a contract level, Industry may feel different.
What is also interesting to note is that the P-Value for all Hypothesis items is
significant at the 0.0001 level.
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Key Highlights of Coded Responses.
Overall, the coded responses remain consistent with the Closed Ended items of
their respective Hypotheses. While there are some patterns of more conviction in
the open-ended responses over the closed-ended responses, overall there is
consistency. However, it is important to note that some of the open-ended
responses led to some responses that have provided interesting findings for the
research, which will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
The coding process was as follows:
1. Open-ended responses were collected in the surveys
2. Responses were auto-coded in NVivo
3. Responses were then manual coded using the In Vivo method, which lays
out themes with the intent of giving respondents an overall voice (Saldaña,
2015). Thus, in this case those voices are both the Government and the
Defense Industry.
4. Recurring items were cross-compared between the auto-coded responses
and manual coded responses and were provided in the charts in Chapter 4.
5. Key themes that supported the Hypotheses were noted throughout Chapters
4 and 5
6. Unique themes that differed from what was measured were provided in
Chapter 5 in more detail with interpretations of the meanings.
Below are some of the key highlights made by the respondents:
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Hypothesis 1
•

Significant agreement that there are increased mergers and acquisitions as a
result of BBP.

•

Important to note that these acquisitions seem to be larger enterprises
absorbing smaller enterprises. If this being the case, it would go against one
of the goals of BBP to increase competition and small business
participation.

Hypothesis 2
•

Less efficiency in the contracting process, increased costs, increased
regulations, and increased bureaucracy. Thus, based on these results, BBP
has showed increased perception of increased transaction costs.

•

Increased usage for Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs) as a potential
contracting vehicle, this is an important finding and the implications will be
discussed later in Chapter 5.

Hypothesis 3
•

Innovation has decreased due to fear of Contracting Officers taking risks,
the Government reluctant to allow industry disrupters, and reduced R&D
funding.

Hypothesis 4
•

Small businesses are the most impacted by BBP and the most likely to
either be acquired or exit the industry.
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•

Direct impacts of BBP has resulted in reduced competition and innovation
that has moved to the commercial market due to high profit margins.

Contribution to Applied Practice
The study contributed to the practice in three ways. First, it contributed to
the theoretical literature in that it expanded the Industrial Organization literature, as
identified in Chapter 2 “Industry Structure Continuum.” It examined the trends in
competitive collaboration, which can assist in identifying the potential of supplier
countervailing power. The second area of contribution is that the study examined
the managerial implications of acquisition reform in the form of contract costs,
innovation, and diversification. Finally, the study contributed in providing a
program review of BBP to identify its effects on the industry. The following
chapter, Chapter 5, will go into further detail as to the contribution of the study, the
implications of the study, and final recommendations.
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Chapter 5: Discussions, Implications, Recommendations
Overview
Chapter 4 laid out the findings of the study. The following chapter consists
of a discussion of the results, the implications of the results, and evidence-based
recommendations for further addressing the problem from a managerial perspective
as well as a theoretical framework from an academic perspective. The next section
will discuss the contribution of the study from a theoretical view on two bases: the
model contribution to the Industrial Organization continuums completed in Chapter
2 and a model developed for countervailing power for suppliers developed after the
completion of this study. The subsequent section will discuss the implications of
these findings from a pragmatic perspective and how these contributions can be
applied. The final section will discuss further recommendations, ideas for future
research, and will conclude the dissertation.
Contribution of the Study
The study first contributed to the literature during the proposal process. The
contribution was discussed in Chapter 2 when it identified that the “Market
Structure” within the Industrial Organization (IO) literature had not been clearly
defined. As it stands, the IO literature provides a spectrum for understanding
industry concentration. The continuum begins with perfect competition, which in
prior literature assumes markets are fully efficient and competition is fluid with no
capability for monopolies (Chamberlin, 1933). The efficient market hypothesis is
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contradicted by the additions of monopolistic competition, oligopolies, and
monopolies creating a continuum of increased company market share (Roberts,
1987). Thus, the very existence of the IO literature is that Perfect Competition is
not the only type of industry and arguably, Fragmented Buyers is not the only type
of market respectively. The IO literature also discusses oligopsonies and
monopsonies, with monopsonies being the main focal point of the study. What is
absent from the literature, but implied, is a mirrored continuum for buyer
concentration. Therefore, the study identified the concepts of “Fragmented
Buyers” to mirror “Perfect Competition” and “Bargaining Buyers” to mirror
“Monopolistic Competition” and thus arguably complete the industry structure
continuum for buyers. These inferences were created from the comparison that
OECD (2008) made to monopsonies and buyers with bargaining power as well as
buyers with no market power. The idea is that like “Perfect Competition,”
“Fragmented Buyers” are numerous and compete off one another for supply, thus
giving vendors many choices eliminating negotiation power to these buyers, an
example being retail shoppers (Jimenez, 2002). In addition, like “Monopolistic
Competition,” “Bargaining Power Buyers” have some level of market power
despite being numerous, example being a car dealership, where a buyer can
negotiate the price, but still ultimately has little market power. Overall, within the
IO literature, just like there is a continuum within the seller portion of industry, the
literature, and this research, demonstrates that there is also a respective continuum
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of buyers within a market. Thus, an industry’s most optimal position is for it to be
a monopoly where as a market’s optimal position is to be a monopsony.
Below is the IO Structure figure provided in Chapter 2:
Figure 3 Industrial Organization Continuum
Market Structure Continuum
(Mariti & Smiley, 1983)

Industry Structure Continuum
(OECD, 2008)

Perfect Competition
(Roberts, 1987)

Fragmented Buyer (Cox,
2001)

Monopolistic Competition
(Roberts, 1987)

Bargaining Power Buyer
(OECD, 2008)

Oligopoly (Bain, 1949)

Oligopsony (Bhaskar & To,
2003)

Monopoly (Demsetz, 1973)

Monopsony (Caves, 1980)

Yellow: Defense Industry (Based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Davis,
2006).
Green: Arms Market (USG) based on attributes of monopsonies (OECD, 2008).
As discussed in Chapter 3, it was the intent of this study to assist in filling
the gap in the Industrial Organization literature, that gap being an understanding as
to how countervailing power can work for suppliers as opposed to the original
theory being applied to buyers. It was also the intent to examine the managerial
implications of the study and an overall review of Better Buying Power as well as
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potential recommendations for future acquisition reform, both of these will be
discussed in the following section ‘Discussion and Implications.’ Thus overall,
countervailing power has both theoretical and pragmatic applications.
The idea of countervailing power, is traditionally, where buyers attempt to
extract channel power from powerful suppliers, this is accomplished by a buyer
creating new competition by entering the market oneself or competing existing
suppliers off of another (only possible if it is an oligopoly and not a monopoly),
and controlling the level of demand (Chen, 2003). The study examined how
countervailing power may be implemented from a supplier perspective, something
absent from the literature (Snyder, 1996). To accomplish this, the study examined
competitive collaboration and pluralism as methods of countervailing power and
hypothesized increases in both as a result of BBP.
Since there is support for Hypothesis 1, it may be apparent that there is
support for these tactics. Additionally, the open-ended responses appeared to be in
support of Hypothesis 1. Common themes that appeared in the coded responses
were: corporate consolidation, enterprise consolidation, influence, larger industry
partner, increased communication, and collective political influence.
In addition, Hypothesis 4 inferred that there would be an increase in
diversification, during the proposal process of the study, this concept was not
included as a tactic for countervailing power; however, the results of the survey
seem to indicate otherwise, which while unintentional, is significant. Since there is
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also support for Hypothesis 4, this indicates support that diversification, alongside
pluralism, and co-opetition can be methods of countervailing power. This is due to
the fact that diversification gives defense contractors more options in other markets
and thus less dependency on defense sales. Therefore, commercial diversification
can serve as another form of countervailing power. The open-ended responses
showed support Hypothesis 4. Common supporting themes that appeared were
dual-use contracting, commercial contracting, niche technologies, service business,
and small business diversification. It is interesting to note that there was a common
theme of small businesses being more likely to diversify, this could further
decrease competition for larger enterprises. It is also interesting to note that small
business diversification appeared as a common coded theme, this may be due to the
fact that since small businesses have less vested capital tied to the defense industry
as opposed to larger companies, they may be more likely to diversify. What the
respondents made clear was that small businesses were the most heavily hit as a
result of BBP. This may be due to the fact that larger enterprises had more capital
to protect themselves from the impact. What the respondents also made clear is
that there are increases in Defense Industry consolidation with larger companies
acquiring smaller companies as well as mergers of equals.
Below is a framework for how countervailing power is presented for suppliers in
the Defense Industry work:
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Figure 4 Path to Countervailing Power

Key:
Countervailing Influencers = Purple
Industry Structure = Green
Balance of Power = Blue
Market Structure (Monopsonist) = Orange
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The above figure illustrated how a fragmented industry, can increase its
monopoly power, to counter monopsonistic power. The fragmented industry in this
case is the Defense Industry, in effect it represents any industry that is not a
monopoly (i.e., Perfect Competition, Monopolistic Competition, and Oligopoly),
thus fragmented in that it is not whole as a Monopoly. Pluralism, Co-Opetition,
and Diversification are the elements of countervailing power, that was researched
in this study, which reaches monopoly power. In effect, what countervailing power
can accomplish is a bilateral monopoly. A bilateral monopoly is when the market
has a monopsony and the industry has a monopoly (Campbell, 2007), thus a
balance of power (Siegel & Fouraker, 1960). While this is impractical due to antitrust laws and due to the fact that collaboration can increase internal transaction
costs due to intellectual property protection needs (Hennart, 1988), countervailing
power can assist in making the market/industry closer to a bilateral monopoly
though likely not fully. The next section discusses the contribution of the study by
going over the managerial implications of the research in two areas: first by
establishing recommended approaches to both the Government and Defense
Contractors and then a review of the impacts of BBP.
Discussion and Implications
Overview.
The previous section focused on the theoretical contribution of the
dissertation; this section will now focus on the practical implications of the study
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by examining recommendations for the Defense Industry and the U.S. Government.
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 found support in the study; thus, the implications
for this are that there are perceptions of an upward trend in contract costs and a
downward trend in innovation, respectively, as a result of BBP. Common themes
in support of Hypothesis 2 was significant cost increases, burdensome
requirements, cost creep, inefficiencies, and extra non-value-added steps. Common
themes related to Hypothesis 3, from the respondents, was the concept of the need
to capitalize on disruptive technologies and the need for the Government to
leverage innovation industry trends. Throughout all four of the open-ended
responses there were significant mentions to Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs)
as being increased in usage as a result of BBP. According to current
Undersecretary of Defense Ellen Lord (Mehta, 2017), the timeliness within
Government contracting has been high; thus, there are increases in the usage of
OTAs as a workaround. An OTA is a contracting vehicle that does not follow
standard government contracting methods, such as the FAR and DFARS. Simply
put, they are instruments utilized to speed up the transaction process to get needed
products and services, typically prototype goods, out quickly. Thus, it is apparent
that the Government is beginning to recognize the need to speed the contracting
process such that it is going out of its way to use non-conventional contracting
methods (Davis & Wilson, 2011). Thus, revisions to BBP to improve the
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contracting process and therefore accepting non-conventional contracting could be
beneficial in improving the timeliness of Government contracting.
Previously, industry collaboration was discussed as an element of
countervailing power. However, consider the case of T-Mobile, at present TMobile is attempting to merge with Sprint. Because of the small concentrated
number of cellular providers, there are anti-trust concerns (Hardy, 2018). TMobile, however, has capitalized on the need for the merger to compile both
companies’ resources to speed up the creation of 5G (Zhang, 2017). T-Mobile’s
argument is the need to develop 5G before China develops the technology, which
could be a potential national security risk despite not being defense technology and
thus is convincing lawmakers to approve the merger. At present, T-Mobile feels
confident that this argument will allow the merger to be approved. This is also in
alignment with the National Defense Strategy, which discusses the need to position
the U.S. military via innovation to counter, Russia and China as emerging peer
rivals (Mattis, 2018). Thus, it may be in the Government’s best interest to
potentially encourage defense corporate consolidation or collaboration on muchneeded programs of national security (Cheung, 2013). This is already present with
the utilization of defense industry consortiums. Some of these consortiums
specialize in OTAs. Industry collaboration, in the form of mergers, teaming
agreements, joint-ventures, and consortiums, while can serve to strengthen the
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Defense Industry’s position, could also serve to enhance the goals of the
Government through innovation (Ucko, 2008).
Recommendations to the Government and Defense Industry.
Thus, based on this study, the recommendations to the Government are as follows:
•

Limit the usage of FPIF and CPIF contracts, which increased after BBP, but
were found to be burdensome and potentially disincentivized innovation
according to the open-ended responses in the survey.

•

Encourage industry collaboration on critical products and services to meet
the needs of current peer adversaries based on questions from survey items
Q10 through Q13, which all had P-Values of 0.000.

•

Continue to capitalize on commercial contracting to be retrofitted for
defense purposes based on questions from survey items Q25 through Q28,
which all had P-Values of 0.000.

•

Incentivize defense partners to innovate, not just via R&D, but via free
knowledge growth, such as the case of Defense Acquisition University, as
per one of the goals of BBP based on questions from survey items Q20
through Q23, which all had P-Values of 0.000.

•

Measure and take into account the actual contracting costs, examine the
trade-offs of reducing some of the processes and the measurable risks to the
program and make a decision based on cost reduction, speed of contracting,
and needs to national security.
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Recommendations for the Defense Industry are:
•

Diversify commercially by taking advantage of redeployment strategies in
order to retrofit defense technologies that may be used for commercial
purposes to reduce risks of a lower defense budget (Anand, 2004).

•

Increase international sales to further boost diversification

•

Work with the Government to establish needed means of collaboration that
could benefit defense contractors as to avoid price wars and yet meet the
Government’s security needs

•

Capitalize on collaboration on programs needed to engage peer adversaries.

•

Examine create a cost-benefit analysis between contract costs and
production costs before and after BBP based on questions from survey
items Q15 through Q18, which all had P-Values of 0.000.
Analysis of BBP.
In the survey, when asked has BBP succeeded in its intended purpose, the

responses have been mixed skewing slightly in disagreement. 5 Percent said they
strongly agreed, 15 percent said they agreed, 17 percent said they somewhat
agreed, 20 percent were neutral, 18 percent somewhat disagreed, 21 percent said
they disagreed, and 5 percent said they strongly disagreed. The coded themes seem
stronger in their convictions, NVivo detected a 60.87 percent negative sentiment.
The themes state some mixed responses to some stronger. Phrases such as “major
change” come contrary to phrases like “little change.” However, common themes
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such as excessive regulation, cost overruns, and contract cost overruns were
mentioned more often and thus stood out in showing cost impacts as a result of
BBP. Since this study examined perceptions and one of the measures was contract
costs, it would appear that BBP has increased costs, de-incentivized innovation,
encouraged collaboration, and encouraged diversification. However, it would be
interesting to examine a comparison of changes in production costs and compare it
to changes in contract costs and to see if first production costs decreased and if so,
is the trade-off worth it? Note that this study only focused on contract costs. The
final section will discuss recommendations for future research as well as conclude
the study.
Recommendations and Conclusions
The previous section discussed the implications of the study and
recommended approaches to both the Defense Industry and the U.S. Government.
While easier said than done, if implemented, these recommendations could benefit
the Government by creating a starting point as to further streamline the acquisition
process, encourage innovation, and understand the impact of transaction costs to
production costs and determine if a tradeoff approach is best (Hoffman, 2011). For
the Defense Industry, the above recommendations could serve to strengthen their
negotiation position, boast diversification on both commercial and foreign sales,
and capitalize on the future demands of the Government.
As it stands, this research can be furthered by the following:
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•

Utilization of actual cost data over perceptions

•

Comparison of contract costs to production costs and conduct a
tradeoff analysis

•

Analysis of Foreign Sales as a potential form of countervailing
power

Focusing on the last point, in the National Defense Strategy, Secretary of
Defense Mattis (2018) stresses the importance of national alliances and equipping
these allies with much needed military products and services. This item could be a
potential opportunity for the Defense Industry to expand its portfolio and for the
Government to create jobs, strengthen alliances, and increase economic balance of
trade.
After the results of this study, a new research question emerged that could
be used for future research.
Future Research Question: Are there benefits to the Government to allow a
strengthened position for defense contractors to compete internationally and
commercially in order to strengthen the Government’s overall position
militarily?
As a result of this research question, three propositions have emerged as potentials
for future research:
Proposition 1: Increases in international sales could also be a potential for
countervailing power.
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Proposition 2: A monopsonist may benefit from controlled levels of corporate
consolidation to fit its demand goals, for the Government this may be
internationally.
Proposition 3: Small businesses are more likely to enter commercial markets due to
the fact they have less capital investments tied to the Defense Industry as opposed
to their larger peers.
Overall, it was the intent of this study to explore the potential of
improvements to acquisition reform, to explore how countervailing power could be
implemented in theory, and to examine the current impact of BBP. Thus, this study
can assist in setting the groundwork for future research in the IO literature and
recommended strategies for acquisition reform. This study is not intended to be an
end to a means; instead this study is intended to serve as a benchmark for this area
of study with the goal of creating a contribution to the gap in the literature and
sparking more research into Government and Industry joint strategy.
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Appendix A
Definition of Terms
The following are key terms that have been and will be used throughout this
dissertation. The definitions have been defined from the literature, industry
terminology, and applicable definitions by the Researcher that apply to this
dissertation. In addition, this list includes acronyms spelled out for reference that
has been used throughout the document.
Acquisition Streamlining: The objective of acquisition streamlining is to reduce the
time and cost required for acquiring systems. In order to improve the quality of
those systems by ensuring that solicitations and contracts contain only necessary
specification standards and related documents that have been tailored for
application at the most appropriate time in the acquisition cycle (Nash, Schooner,
and O'Brien-DeBakey, 2013).
AIA: Aerospace Industries Association
Arms Manufacturing Market (Arms Market): As it pertains to this study, are the
buyer/customers who acquire products and services from the Defense Industry.
Primarily, this includes the U.S. Government. In addition, this market can include,
but is not limited to, foreign governments, other defense contractors, State and
Local Governments, and commercial buyers both domestic and international.
Best Value: As defined by the Department of Defense, is the “competitive,
negotiated procurements in which the Government reserves the right to select the
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most advantageous offer to the Government by evaluating and comparing factors in
addition to cost or price (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2005).
BBP: Better Buying Power
Contracting Officer: An individual authorized to contract on behalf of the
Government (Federal Acquisition Regulations, 2005).
Contractor: For the sake of this dissertation and unless specified otherwise,
Contractor was defined as a member of the Defense Industry or defense contractor.
Defense Industry: “The Defense Industrial Base Sector is the worldwide industrial
complex that enables research and development, as well as design, production,
delivery, and maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and
components or parts, to meet U.S. military requirements.” (Department of
Homeland Security, 2013). For the sake of this dissertation, and unless specified
otherwise, the Defense Industry shall be limited to only the Defense Industry of the
United States.
DFARS: Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS): According to the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA), (2017), a DCS contract is a contract in which the defense
contractor sells military products and services directly to the foreign country. A
DCS sale is heavily regulated and must be approved by the DSCA and not violate
the ITAR.
FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation
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Foreign Military Sales (FMS): According to the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) (2017), an FMS contract is a contract in which a defense
contractor sells to the United States Government who in turn sells to a Foreign
Military entity. In an FMS contract, the defense contractor does not sell directly to
the foreign entity.
GSA: General Services Administration
Government: For the sake of this dissertation and unless specified otherwise,
Government shall be defined solely as the United States Government.
Incentive Contract: A negotiated pricing arrangement that gives the contractor
higher profit and fees for better performance or lower profits for worse
performance in prescribed areas (cost, delivery, or technical performance), (Nash,
Schooner, and O'Brien-DeBakey, 2013).
ITAR: International Traffic in Arms Regulations
Monopsony: A situation in which there is only one buyer within a market
(Grundman, 2010).
NCMA: National Contract Management Association
NDIA: National Defense Industrial Association
Sequestration: According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2011),
sequestration is the automatic spending cuts to the U.S. Government budget set in
motion on January 1, 2013, as a result of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011.
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Warfighter: The U.S. Department of Defense defines warfighter as a soldier in
combat. The term Warfighter is inclusive of all branches of the military including
the Army, Navy, Marines, Airforce, and the Coast Guard. Warfighter can also
include members of the intelligence community.

135

Appendix B
Government Contracting Process.
According to the Department of Defense (2012), the Government
contracting process is as follows:
1. First, the U.S. Government conducts acquisition planning and market
research for what products/services that are in need.
2. The need is then electronically advertised in the Federal Business
Opportunities site.
3. The solicitation is then sent electronically to the vendors.
4. The vendors then submit their proposals to the solicitations.
5. The Government then evaluates the bids from the contractors.
6. If applicable, the vendors present their proposal to the U.S. Government.
7. If applicable, the Government and the vendors negotiate the terms of the
contract and pricing.
8. Large vendors then submit their subcontracting plan as required by
regulations.
9. If it is a competitive bid versus sole source, the Government makes a down
selection and debriefs the vendors.
10. Finally, the contract is awarded.
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History of Federal Procurement and Acquisition Reform.
As of now, according to the Defense Acquisition University (2012), BBP is
the latest in U.S. Government implementations of defense acquisition reform. BBP
was initiated by Carter (2010), at the time Under Secretary of Defense, in his
memorandum from the Pentagon titled BBP: Guidance for Obtaining Greater
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending. In this memorandum, Former
Undersecretary of Defense Ashton Carter laid out his plan to improve the
acquisition process by seeking best value products for the military and taxpayers
with the concept of “do more without more.” BBP has since gone through updates,
from its inception to BBP 2.0 and BBP 3.0. However, BBP is not the first form of
defense acquisition reform. According to Reeves (1996), acquisition reform has
had its roots in the United States all the way back to the revolutionary war. In a
200-year span, Congress has passed over 4000 acquisition statutes. However, it
was not until after World War I and World War II, where the Government began to
issue major reform within its defense procurement process.
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Appendix C
Overview of the Defense Industry
At the commencement of this research, an industrial analysis, as well as a
market analysis, and organizational analyses were compiled and summarized to
both assist the researcher and the reader. Thus, this data is only current as of 2016.
Industry Description and Outlook.
For the sake of this study, the Defense Industry segments have been looked
primarily under the North American Industry Classification Codes (NAICS)
336410A (Aircraft, Engine & Parts Manufacturing in the US) (Soshkin, 2016) and
336410B (Space Vehicle & Missile Manufacturing in the US) (Soshkin, 2016).
This data was compiled from industry reports such as Marketline, IBISWorld, and
Government Publications. These industry segments are inclusive of weapon
systems, vehicles, aerospace technology, space systems, and etc.
According to Marketline (2015), the Defense Industry is based on the
revenue generated from the civil and military procurements of aerospace and
defense technology. The Defense Industry had a collective market capitalization of
over $461.9 Billion. The Defense Industry has experienced a negative growth rate
averaging -1.6 percent in years 2010 to 2014. However, the industry is projected to
show positive growth up to 2019. According to the IBISWorld Industry Report, the
Defense Industry lifecycle is in the mature phase (Soshkin, 2016). Table 2 shows a
list of the top 10 U.S. Defense Contractors by revenue in 2015 provided by Statista.
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Table 2: Industry Expenditures

Table 2 was taken from Statista, McCarthy (2016). According to the
Department of Defense, the top three leading U.S. Defense Contractors are
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon by defense revenue. As of September
2017, Northrop Grumman plans to acquire Orbital ATK, which will solidify them
as the number 2 Defense Contractor in the world (Cameron, 2017).
Representing Trade Associations used in the Study.
The National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) is an American
industry trade association that represents the Defense Industry. This association is
a collective industry association that represents U.S. defense contractors to public
venues and the Government. The National Contract Management Association
(NCMA) is representative of professionals who work in the field of contracting;
this is both inclusive of Government and commercial contracting.
139

Pricing and gross margin targets.
According to IBISWorld, the Defense Industry revenue is over $240 Billion,
and Industry profit is currently at $24.9 Billion collectively.
Competitive Analysis and Industry Attractiveness.
Utilizing the Porter (1980) Five Force model, the industry attractiveness is
as follows based on the Industry Reports of Marketline and IBISWorld:
Intensity of Competitive Rivalry: Competitive Rivalry is high, with major
defense contractors competing for high dollar contracts.
Threat of New Entrants: With high barriers to entry due to high capital
intensity, government regulations, and established competitors, Threat of New
Entrants is low at the moment.
Threat of Substitutes: Because there are virtually no products that can
substitute defense articles, Threat of Substitutes are low.
Power of Suppliers: Supplier Power is moderate because there are many
suppliers; competition amongst suppliers can reduce supplier power, but because of
specified products and capabilities, some suppliers benefit from high supplier
power.
Power of Buyers: If including the U.S. Government, Foreign Governments,
other Defense Contractors, and Commercial Buyers, buyer power is moderate due
to the fact that Defense Contractors like Boeing have some large segments that are
commercial. However, since this study focuses on U.S. Government to Defense
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Industry relations and since the U.S. Government has the regulatory capability to
prevent contractors from selling internationally, such buyer power is high. Also,
the Government’s capability to access financial and technical data, authority to
audit, ability to limit specifications for international sales, and other regulatory
powers per the FAR and ITAR, the U.S. Government as a buyer has very high
buyer power.
Industry Attractiveness: According to Wernerfelt & Montgomery (1986), an
attractive industry is one that has high growth and high profitability. Based on
analysis of the Five Force Model, overall the Defense Industry is moderately
attractive. According to Marketline (2015), profitability and growth are only
moderate, thus based on Wernerfelt & Montgomery (1986), this would be
considered a moderately attractive industry.
Overview of the Arms Manufacturing Market.
Primary Customers.
According to Marketline (2015), the primary customers of the Defense
Industry include the United States Government, Foreign Governments, Defense
Contractors, State Governments, Local Governments, and other Commercial
markets. Primarily, the United States Government is the largest customer in the
U.S. Defense Industry.
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Customer Requirements.
The United States Government primarily conducts its defense acquisition
from the Department of Defense in which the Defense Department procures
military technology, missile defense systems, aerospace technology, cyberspace
technology, and various other defense products and services.
Customer Size.
According to the CIA World Factbook (2016), the United States
Government spends more in defense spending than all other nations combined by
dollar amount; the Government is also currently the 9th nation that spends the most
on defense in respect in percentage to its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
According to the Small Business Administration (2017), the United States
Government is the largest customer in the world. The United States Government
spends over 20 percent of its budget on Defense Spending. With respect to Foreign
Military Sales (FMS), the United States Government is responsible for procurement
of military products and services from U.S. Defense Contractors and sales to the
Foreign Military itself. While Defense Contractors have increased their
international military sales, a large part of these sales is FMS, and thus, despite
selling to other countries, the U.S. Government is still the primary customer.
Market Segments.
According to Marketline (2015), the arms market breaks into multiple
segments. Primarily the Arms Market is broken into two segments, Defense and
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Aerospace. These segments are further broken down by product types, which
include fighter jets, sensors, missiles, space systems, military vehicles, small arms,
missile targeting defense, and cyber warfare.
Market Share.
As mentioned, the size of the market is over $400 Billion. Lockheed
Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman have some of the largest market shares
when taking into account defense sales only. Lockheed Martin is the largest
Defense Contractor in the world by defense sales. However, Boeing is a larger
enterprise than Lockheed Martin if including commercial sales into the portfolio.
Organizational Analysis of Lockheed Martin.
Summary.
According to the Lockheed Martin (2016) 10-K report, Lockheed Martin is
a leading U.S. Defense Contractor. Lockheed Martin has sales in both domestic
and international markets and sells primarily military products and services,
however, the company does sell some commercial products and services.
Company description.
According to the Lockheed Martin (2016) 10-K report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 31, 2016, Lockheed Martin
states that they are a global security and aerospace enterprise focusing on research,
design, development, manufacturing, integration, and sustainment of advanced
technological products and services. Over 78 percent of sales are from the United
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States Government. The remaining 21 percent of military sales includes Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Because FMS sales are
contracted to the U.S. Government, the Government is still the buyer in these cases.
Thus, it is anticipated that Lockheed Martin’s sales to the U.S. government far
exceeds 78 percent. The remaining 1 percent of sales are commercial products sold
both in the United States and internationally.
Lockheed Martin Corporation during the publication of their 2015 10-K
report was broken into five business areas; these included Aeronautics (Aero),
Missiles and Fire Control (MFC), Mission Systems and Training (MST),
Information Systems & Global Solutions (IS&GS), and Space Systems Company
(SSC). During late 2015 and early 2016, Lockheed Martin divested the IS&GS
business area, which was acquired by Leidos, around the same time Lockheed
Martin acquired Sikorsky from United Technologies Corporation. Lockheed
Martin incorporated the Sikorsky acquisition under the MST business area and had
since rebranded MST to become Rotary Mission Systems (RMS).
Organization and Management.
Lockheed Martin is currently a publicly traded company listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. As of 2017, the company is currently broken into four
business areas: Aero, MFC, RMS, and SSC. In addition, the company owns
multiple subsidiaries and has ownership in various joint ventures. The company’s
executive officers, as of 2016, include: Marillyn Hewson (CEO, President, and
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Chairman), Richard Ambrose (Executive Vice President of Space Systems), Dale
Bennett (Executive Vice President of Rotary Mission Systems), Orlando Carvalho
(Executive Vice President of Aeronautics), Richard Edwards (Executive Vice
President of Missiles and Fire Control), Bruce Tanner (CFO), and Brian Colan
(CAO).
Key Products and Services.
As mentioned, Lockheed Martin specializes in military products and
services that include fighter jets, missile defense, cybersecurity, space technology,
and armored vehicles. Based on the company’s (2016) 10-K report, its signature
products and services include the F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike
Fighter, C-130 Hercules, F-16 Fighting Falcon, C-5M Super Galaxy, and various
sustainment services.
Financial Status.
According to Yahoo Finance (2017), Lockheed Martin had a Net Profit of
over $3.6 Billion in 2016. As of February 5, 2017, the company had a market
capitalization of $73.74 Billion. Also, the company had a capital structure of 93.7
percent debt to 6.3 percent equity. Finally, the company had current cash on
demand of $1.09 Billion.
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Organizational Analysis of Boeing.
Summary.
According to the Boeing (2016) 10-K report, Boeing is a U.S. Defense
Contractor with sales in both domestic and international markets and sells
commercial, military, and capital investment.
Company description.
The Boeing Company (Boeing) is both a commercial enterprise and a large
defense contractor. According to the Boeing (2016) 10-K report, the company is
known for the sales of its commercial aircraft, military aircraft, space technology,
and global services technologies. Over 64 percent of the company’s sales are with
the United States Department of Defense. The remaining 36 percent include
Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales, and Commercial Sales. Just as
the case with Lockheed Martin, Foreign Military Sales can still be considered sales
with the Department of Defense since the Government is the immediate buyer
before the foreign government.
Boeing operates in five different business segments, which include
Commercial Aircrafts, Boeing Military Aircraft (BMA), Network & Space Systems
(N&SS), Global Services & Support (GS&S), and Boeing Capital (BCC).
Organization and Management.
Boeing is currently a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. As of 2017, the company is currently broken into five business
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segments: Commercial Aircraft, BMA, N&SS, GS&S, and BCC. It should be
noted that BMA, N&SS, and GS&S serve under the Defense, Space & Security
(BDS) business area. In addition, the company owns multiple subsidiaries and has
ownership in various joint ventures. The company’s current executive officers
include: Dennis A. Muilenburg (CEO, President, and Chairman), Leanne G. Caret
(Executive Vice President of Defense, Space & Security), Kevin G. McAllister
(Executive Vice President of Commercial Airplanes), Tim Myers (President of the
Boeing Capital Segment) and Gregory D. Smith (CFO).
Key Products and Services.
As mentioned, Boeing specializes in both military and commercial products
and services that include fighter jets, commercial aircraft, financial services, space
technology, and armored vehicles. Based on the company’s (2016) 10-K report, its
signature products and services include the 787 Dreamliner, F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet, AH-64 Apache Helicopter, space rocket technologies, 747 Aircraft, and
various services.
Financial Status.
According to Yahoo Finance (2017), Boeing had a Net Profit of over $4.895
Billion in 2016. As of February 21, 2017, the company had a market capitalization
of $105.78 Billion. Also, the company has a capital structure of 99.09 percent debt
to 0.91 percent equity. According to Harris and Raviv (1991), a capital structure
like Boeing’s would provide the most value to shareholders since debt is much
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higher than equity and thus due to tax purposes and less shareholder dilution, such
a capital structure would be valuable. However, such a capital structure with high
debt to equity carries a very high risk of default (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2015).
Finally, the company had current cash on demand of $8.801 Billion.
Organizational Analysis of Northrop Grumman.
Summary.
According to the Northrop Grumman (2017) 10-K report, Northrop
Grumman is a U.S. defense and global security company with sales in both
domestic and international markets and sells mostly military products and services
with minor commercial sales.
Company Description.
Northrop Grumman is a major defense contractor selling primarily to the
United States Government, but also sells to state, local, and foreign governments.
In addition, the company has only a small portion of commercial sales. According
to Northrop Grumman’s (2017) 10-K report, the company is known for sales of
defense products and services such as the B-2 Spirit Bomber, B-21 Raider, space
technology, sensors, cybersecurity, autonomous systems, manned aircraft fighters,
and sustainment services. Northrop Grumman has over 84 percent of sales to the
United States Government; this is not including Foreign Military Sales, which still
will be through the United States Government and then sold to the foreign entity.
The remaining sales include Direct Commercial Sales and commercial sales.
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Northrop Grumman has three business units, which include Aerospace
Systems, Mission Systems, and Technology Services. In addition to the abovementioned business units, Northrop Grumman also has various subsidiaries.
Organization and Management.
Northrop Grumman is currently a publicly traded company listed on the
New York Stock Exchange. As mentioned, as of 2017, the company is currently
broken into three business units: Aerospace Systems, Mission Systems, and
Technology Services. The company’s current executive officers include: Wesley G.
Bush (CEO, President, and Chairman), Thomas E. Vice (Corporate Vice President
and President, Aerospace Systems Sector), Kathy J. Warden (Corporate Vice
President and President, Mission Systems Sector) and Kenneth L. Bedingfield
(CFO).
Key Products and Services.
Based on the Northrop Grumman’s (2017) 10-K report, the company mostly
sells military technology including fighter jets, bombers, cybersecurity, space
technology, and autonomous systems. Northrop Grumman also supports
sustainment services, radar systems, and components from other major weapon
systems such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Finally, the company also specializes
in both missiles and missile defense technologies.
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Financial Status.
According to Yahoo Finance (2017), Northrop Grumman had a Net Profit of
over $2.20 Billion. As of February 26, 2017, the company had a market
capitalization of $42.79 Billion. In addition, the company has a capital structure of
79.47 percent debt to 20.53 percent equity. Finally, the company has current cash
on demand of $2.54 Billion.
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Appendix D
Perceptions of the Respondents
Below is a layout of the perceptions of the respondents and how the survey
responses were measured prior to data collection. These perceptions are based on
the survey questions and the potential responses a participant can make.
The perceptions were based on a before and after measured outcome
comparison. Perceptions of the respondents were based on before Better Buying
Power’s implementation and after its implementation to make a comparison.
Perceived Collaboration.
•

Political Influence (When a respondent favors “After” as a Likert
response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase in this
category.)

•

Complementary Products (When a respondent favors “After” as a Likert
response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase in this
category.)

•

Mergers and Acquisitions (When a respondent favors “After” as a Likert
response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase in this
category.)

•

General Competitive Collaboration (When a respondent favors “After”
as a Likert response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an
increase in this category.)
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•

Impact on Government Decision making (The intent of this category
was to investigate, based on an open-ended response, the level of impact
on Government Decision making based on BBP. Responses showing
indication of increased influence indicate that BBP has had an impact)

Perceived Contract Costs.
•

Contract Costs (When a respondent favors “After” as a Likert response,
this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase in this category.)

•

Timelines (When a respondent favors “After” as a Likert response, this
appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase in this category.)

•

Streamlined Government Contracting process (When a respondent
favors “After” as a Likert response, this appears to indicate that BBP has
led to an increase in this category.)

•

Government Contracting process efficiency (When a respondent favors
“After” as a Likert response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to
an increase in this category.)

•

General impacted costs (In this open-ended item, the intent was to
examine what costs, as well as other categories, have been impacted as a
result of BBP.)
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Innovation.
•

Research and Development (When a respondent favors “After” as a
Likert response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase
in this category.)

•

Innovation (When a respondent favors “After” as a Likert response, this
appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase in this category.)

•

Developmental Contracts (When a respondent favors “After” as a Likert
response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase in this
category.)

•

Faster Access to Technology (When a respondent favors “After” as a
Likert response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase
in this category.)

•

Examples of Innovation (In this open-ended item, the intent was to
examine other examples of innovation.)

Commercial Diversification.
•

Exit the Arms Market (When a respondent favors “After” as a Likert
response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase in this
category.)

•

Enter into Commercial Contracts (When a respondent favors “After” as
a Likert response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an
increase in this category.)
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•

Dual-use Technologies (When a respondent favors “After” as a Likert
response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase in this
category.)

•

Entering the Arms Market (When a respondent favors “After” as a
Likert response, this appears to indicate that BBP has led to an increase
in this category.)

•

Commercial Investments (In this open-ended item, the intent was to
examine other examples of commercial investment.)
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Appendix E
Defense Acquisition Reform Survey
Study on Better Buying Power's Impact on the U.S. Defense Industry
Overview
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. The purpose of this study is to
examine the effects of acquisition reform within the Defense Industry and to better
understand how these impacts have influenced costs within the Government
contracting process and how the Defense Industry has responded to these
changes. Your responses to this survey can assist this study in investigating the
impacts of Better Buying Power. To better assist in answering the below survey
questions, common definitions have been provided below for reference. Please
answer all of the questions to the best of your ability.

Participation is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue participation at
any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Your responses will assist in better understanding the impacts of U.S. Government
defense acquisition reform (BBP). Please refrain from divulging U.S.G. classified,
foreign government classified, import/export controlled, proprietary, competition
sensitive, personal sensitive, official use only, or otherwise sensitive information in
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your responses.
For any general questions or concerns, please contact the following:

Edgar Quinones
Principal Investigator
Phone: 407-288-3711
Email: equinones2015@my.fit.edu

For questions regarding your rights regarding participation in this research, please
contact the following:

Institutional Review Board (IRB) Contact Information:

Dr. Lisa Steelman
IRB Chairperson
Phone: 321-674-7316
Emails: lsteelma@fit.edu or FIT_IRB@fit.edu

Common Definitions:
Acquisition Reform: The series of Government policy changes intended to change
the buying process.
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Better Buying Power (BBP): A form of acquisition reform intended to: achieve
affordable programs, control costs, incentivize productivity and innovation, reduce
waste, promote competition, improve the acquisition process, and provide better
training of Government employees.
Competition: The participants (or incumbents) within the Defense Industry
competing for market share; the individual companies that make up the Defense
Industry.
Competitive Collaboration: The active engagement between competitors within
the Defense Industry to engage in co-operation, rather than just
competition. Examples include joint-ventures, complementary products and
services, teaming agreements, influencing customer decision making, and
participation in trade associations.
Transaction Costs (Contract Costs): The costs associated with the contractual
arrangement between the Government and the Defense Industry, the costs
associated with the contract process itself. Note, contracts costs are inclusive of
costs within the contracting process itself, this is not inclusive of program costs for
selling products and services.
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Survey Questions
Pre-Screen Questions
1. Please confirm that you consent to take part in this study, note that your identity
will remain anonymous:
I consent to take part in this study
I do not consent to take part in this study.
2. Please note that this survey is open to the following individuals who are:
· Currently or previously a U.S. Defense Industry or U.S. Government employee
· A member of the defense acquisition process (i.e., Contracts, Legal,
Procurement, Finance, Business Development, Program Management,
and etc.)
· A member of NCMA, NDIA, or both.
· Familiar with Better Buying Power (BBP) and Acquisition Reform
Before proceeding, please confirm that you meet the above criteria:
I confirm that I meet the above criteria.
I do not meet the above criteria.
3. Please confirm if you are a member of NCMA or NDIA:
I am a member of NCMA
I am a member of NDIA
I am a member of Both
I am a ______.
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4. I am a ______.
U.S. Department of Defense Employee.
U.S. Defense Contractor Employee
Other (please specify)

5. Approximately how long have you been employed in your current position?
0-2 Years
3-5 Years
6-8 Years
Greater than 8 Years
6. How familiar are you with Acquisition Reform?
Extremely familiar
Very familiar
Somewhat familiar
Not so familiar
Not at all familiar
7. How familiar are you with Better Buying Power?
Extremely familiar
Very familiar
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Somewhat familiar
Not so familiar
Not at all familiar
8. Irrespective of my opinion on Better Buying Power (BBP), I believe BBP has
been successful in what it has stated it has intended to do. See definition of BBP
above or view the following link for more info on BBP: http://bbp.dau.mil/
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Please explain.

9. In regards to Better Buying Power, I feel that I am __________ in making an
informative assessment of its impacts to the Defense Industry based on my
experience with the program.
Extremely confident
Very confident
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Somewhat confident
Not so confident
Not at all confident
Hypothesis 1 Questions
10. Defense Industry investments in political influence within the U.S.
Government has been higher AFTER Better Buying Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
11. Defense contractors engaging in collaboration in the form of complementary
products and services was higher AFTER Better Buying Power’s
implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
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Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
12. Defense contractors engaging in collaboration in the form of mergers and
acquisitions was higher AFTER Better Buying Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
13. Overall competitive collaboration was higher AFTER Better Buying
Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
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Disagree
Strongly Disagree
14. Overall, how has Better Buying Power influenced Defense Industry political
investments, sales of complementary products/services, mergers and
acquisitions, and overall competitive collaboration?

Hypothesis 2 Questions
15. Transaction (Contract) Costs within the Government Contracting
process in the Defense Industry has been higher AFTER Better Buying Power’s
implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
16. The timeliness within the Government Contracting process has been higher
AFTER Better Buying Power’s implementation.
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Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

17. The Government Contracting process has been less streamlined AFTER
Better Buying Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
18. Efficiency within the Government Contracting process has been lower
AFTER Better Buying Power’s implementation.
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Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
19. Overall, based on your experience with acquisition reform, how has Better
Buying Power impacted the Government contracting process in the form of
timeliness, efficiency, overall contracting costs, and streamlining the
acquisition process for defense products and services?

Hypothesis 3 Questions
20. Defense contractors had a higher incentive to engage in Research and
Development AFTER Better Buying Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
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Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
21. Innovation within the Defense Industry has been higher AFTER Better
Buying Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
22. Defense contractors had a higher incentive to engage in developmental
contracts AFTER Better Buying Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
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Disagree
Strongly Disagree
23. The U.S. Military had faster access to newer defense technology AFTER
Better Buying Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
24. Overall, what do you see the impact Better Buying Power has had on in
investing in R&D, innovation, developmental contracts, or creation of new
defense technologies within the Defense Industry?
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Hypothesis 4 Questions
25. Defense contractors are more incentivized to exit the arms market AFTER
Better Buying Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
26. Defense contractors were more likely to enter into commercial markets
AFTER Better Buying Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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27. Defense contractors are more likely to develop dual-use technologies (defense
and commercial) as a means of diversifying their products and services AFTER
Better Buying Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
28. There have been fewer companies entering the Arms Market AFTER Better
Buying Power’s implementation.
Strongly agree
Agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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29. Overall, how has Better Buying Power influenced diversification? Such as
defense contractors exiting the arms market, expanding into commercial
markets, developing dual-use technologies, and the impact on the number of
Defense Industry incumbents, such as new competitors or small business
participation.
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Appendix F
Appendix F is a compilation of the raw data from the open-ended portions of the
survey found in Appendix E.
Question 8
Coded Themes and Elements
Themes

acquisi
tion

acquisition
professionals

change

contract

costs

defense

government

Element
s

acquisi
tion
proces
s

actionable
things
acquisition
professionals

little
change

contract
costs
overrun
s

administrativ
e costs

defense
compani
es

government
acquisition
professionals

Element
s

acquisi
tion
progra
ms

government
acquisition
professionals

major
change

contract
ing
environ
ment

contract
costs
overruns

typical
defense
procure
ments

government
acquisitions

Element
s

action
able
things
acquisi
tion
profess
ionals
govern
ment
acquisi
tion
profess
ionals
govern
ment
acquisi
tions
Uncle
ar
Goals

Lacking
FAR
changes

much
change

contract
ing
officer
incentiv
es

decreasing
costs

Sustain
ment
Costs
rising

government
contracts

Well
intended

contract
s
commu
nity

lowering
costs

Difficult
Execution

govern
ment
contract
s
incentiv
e type
contract
s
multiple
award
contract
solution
s

sustainment
costs

Element
s

Element
s
Element
s
Element
s

OTA
increas
es

Needs
improvem
ent

171

Lower Profits

Waste in
contracting

Needed
changes

Coded Themes and Elements
Themes

incentives

industry

level

little
change

management

process

productivity

Elements

contracting
officer
incentives

industry
investment

execution
level

little
change

disciplined
requirements
management

acquisition
process

increasing
productivity

Elements

incentive
type
contracts

industry
perspective

working
level

Little
action

great
program
managers

external
process

productivity
growth
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Coded Themes and Elements
Themes

programs

regulation

reporting

requirements

solutions

trend

value

Elements

acquisition
programs

burdensome
regulations

annual
reports

disciplined
requirements
management

multiple
award
contract
solutions

negative
trend

value
quality

Elements

affordable
programs

excessive
regulation

overenthusiastic
reporting

far
requirements

value
solutions

recent
trend

value
solutions

Elements

completing
programs

Increased
regulation

Unclear
goals

noncomplex
requirements

Longrun
issues

Working

Elements

great
program
managers

Difficult to
Change

Metrics
needed

Constant
changes

Elements

programs
teams
successful
programs

Elements

Work
Force
Working
Level
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Question 14
acquisition
Themes
Elements
Elements

acquisition
changes
acquisition
climate
acquisition
professionals

Elements
Elements
Elements
Elements
Elements
Elements

Elements

Coded Themes and Elements
acquisition
appropriation budget
process
entire
appropriate
defense
acquisition
training
budgets
process
streamlined
appropriation preparing
acquisition
acts
budget
process
Negligible
impact

change

acquisition
reform
acquisition
world
entire
acquisition
process
streamlined
acquisition
process
tailoring
acquisition
standards
understaffed
acquisition
corps

business

buying
power

business
acumen

buying
power

business
perspective

buying
power
initiative

contractor
business
decisions
defense
businesses
large
businesses

next
initiative
acquisition
changes
big change

much
business

influencing
changes

small
business
viability

little
change
significant
change

OTA usage

Coded Themes and Elements
Themes

Elements
Elements

Elements

communication

companies

competitive
collaboration

consolidation

contractors

corporate

government
communication

defense
companies

competitive
collaboration

corporate
consolidation

contractor
business
decisions

corporate
behaviour

increasing
communication

Small
business
buyout

Consolidation

enterprise
consolidation

large
contractors

corporate
consolidation

Communication
Changes
needed

Increased
mergers

Reduced
competition

Higher
Collaboration

Larger
firms
acquiring
SBs

incumbent
corporations
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Coded Themes and Elements
direct
enterprise

Themes

decisions

defense

Elements

contractor
business
decisions
industry
decisions

defense
budgets
defense
businesses

broad
policy
directive
direct
result

making
investment
decisions

defense
companies

cost

Elements

Elements

Elements

defense
enterprises

Elements

defense
industry
base
large
defense

Elements

controlli
ng cost
growth
cost
principle
s
cost
savings

government

impact

defense
enterprises

government
communication

great
impact

enterprise
consolidation

government
program
managers
government
side

negligible
impact

increasing
communicatio
n
increasing
focus
significant
increase

real
impact

increasing
increased
industry
influence
increasing
awareness

Coded Themes and Elements
Themes

industry

influence

investments

joint
ventures
joint
ventures

markets

opportunities

Elements

defense
industry
base

collective
influence

making
investment
decisions

different
markets

ofoc
opportunities

Elements

increased
industry
influence

increased
industry
influence

political
investments

Teaming
agreements

marketing
strategy

promotion
opportunities

Elements

industry
decisions

influencing
changes

political pac
investments

Mergers

various
markets

partner

Elements

industry
perspective

major
influencer

Acquisitions

Government
Behavior

industrial
partners

Elements

large
industry
partner

substantial
influence

Workshare

Elements

military
clothing
industry

Consortiums
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large
industry
partner

Coded Themes and Elements
Themes

perspective

regulations

right

sequestration

socioeconomic

solutions

Elements

business
perspective

anti-trust
regulations

data rights
submissions

implementing
sequestration

socioeconomic
objectives

breed
solution

Elements

industry
perspective

restrictive
regulations

right
solutions

sequestration
vendors

socioeconomic
status

finding
solutions

Elements

underlying
regulation

Intellectual
Property
issues

Political
pressure

Changes in SB
segmentation

partial
solutions

Elements

Budget
changes

Administration
changes

Elements
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right
solutions
total
solution

Question 19
Coded Themes and Elements
Theme
s

acquisition

acquisitio
n process

contracti
ng

contracti
ng
process
contracti
ng
process

costs

governme
nt

process

Elemen
ts

acquisition
orgs

acquisitio
n process

costly
contracts

administrati
ve costs

acquisitio
n process

contract
award

OTAs as
a
contracti
ng
vehicle

certified
cost

almost
governme
nt
shutdowns
governme
nt
acquisition
command

Elemen
ts

acquisition
process

Costly
Changes

Elemen
ts

acquisition
strategy

Theoretic
al
Not
practical

contract
types

programs

contracting
costs

extra
processes

acquisition
today

contracti
ng costs

large
programs

on-paper
cost creep

governme
nt
contractin
g
governme
nt labs

Elemen
ts
Elemen
ts

acquisition
workforce

contracti
ng
officers

overall
socioeco
nomic
programs

overall
contracting
costs

procurem
ent
process

Elemen
ts

contracti
ng
process

program
managers

tripled
contracting
costs

productio
n process

Elemen
ts

governmen
t
acquisition
command
large
acquisitions

contracti
ng shops

program
outcome
s

Elemen
ts

making
acquisition

Elemen
ts

streamlinin
g
acquisition

sustainm
ent
programs
tripled
contracti
ng costs

Elemen
ts
Elemen
ts

Inefficient

Elemen
ts
Elemen
ts

Less
improved

contracti
ng
squadron
effective
contracti
ng
vehicle
far
contracts
governm
ent
contracti
ng
managing
contracts
overall
contracti
ng costs
quickly
contracts

Elemen
ts

Less
streamlined

contracti
ng
process

inefficien
t process

tradition
al
process
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Question 24
Coded Themes and Elements
contractor

Themes

acquisition

change

Elements

acquisition
commands

changing
environment

Elements

acquisition
community
acquisition
plans

major change

real change

Elements

government
acquisition
authorities
Increased
utilization
of OTAs.
Less
innovation
Under BBP
Industry
unwilling to
invest
Acquisition
reform has
decreased
incentives
Too risky

Elements

defense

Elements

Elements
Elements
Elements
Elements
Elements

contracts

costs

contractor
costs

Lengthy
contracts

contracting
costs

defense
contractor
prime
contractor
costs
Less
options

burdensome
contract types
contract
planning
phase
contracting
costs

increasing
costs
overall cost

technology changes

Sole source

contracting
officers

Slowed
innovation

Less SB
Participation

contracts
publications

Increased
costs low
incentives
developmental
contracts

Less innovation

defense
section

developmental
contracts

developmental
contracts

Stagnant innovation

defense
technology

government
contracts

Less
development

Not incentivized

Military
At risk

defense
contractor

Reduction in
R&D

Innovation
Threatened

operational
contracting
office
rapid response
contracts

noticeable changes
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Costly
innovation

defense
industry

Coded Themes and Elements
Themes

funding

government

industry

innovation

technology

Elements

development
funding

defense
industry

innovation
purchases

defense
technology

Elements

government
funds

government
acquisition
authorities
government
contracts

industry
willingness

innovation
trends

disruptive
technologies

Elements

significant
funding

government
funds

leverage
industry

technological
perspective

Elements

Lower funding

government team

Elements

Inadequate

Unwilling to allow
disrupters

private
industry
technology
industry

true
innovation
needed
Less
innovation
R&D funding
needed

technology
changes
technology
industry

Question 29
Coded Themes and Elements
Themes

base

business

companies

contractors

Elements

industrial base

business
climate

defense companies

contractor entry

Elements

profitable business
base

business
structure

diversified company

defense
contractors

Elements

supplier base

large companies

dod contractors

Elements

Small business
numbers

commercial
business
defense
business

large defense
companies

large defense
contractors

Elements

Decreased small
business participation

large business

sb companies

prime contractors

Elements

Space business
growth

profitable
business base

service companies

small business
contractors

Elements

Commercial growth

risky business

defense contracting

Elements

contracts

government contracts

Elements

class contracts

small business
contractors
small business
participation

Difficult on small
businesses
Non-conventional
contractors

Elements

small business
subcontractors

set aside contracts

Elements

space business

Increased consolidation

Elements

viable business

OTA utilization

services contracts
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Coded Themes and Elements
Themes

defense

defense
contractors

dual use

industry

Elements

defense acquisition
authority customer

defense
contractors

dual use tech

defense industry

Elements

defense budgets

large defense
contractors

dual use
technologies

defense industry incumbents

Elements

defense business

Less small
companies

dual use
technologies

industry consolidations

Elements

defense companies

Less competition

industry partners

Elements

defense contracting

Elements

defense contractors

Elements

defense firms

Shift to
commercial
Less defense
companies
Status quo
of Large
companies

niche
technologies
Disruptive
technologies

Elements

defense industry

commercial markets

Elements

defense industry
incumbents

conventional arms market

Elements

defense market
decrease

defense market changes

Elements

defense markets

defense markets

Elements

defense sales

federal market

Elements

defense sector

government market

Elements

defense spending

private marketability

Elements

large defense
companies

Elements

large defense
contractors

Small businesses unwilling to
participate
market
arms market
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